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Abstract. Two-player quantitative zero-sum games provide a natural framework to synthesize con-
trollers with performance guarantees for reactive systems within an uncontrollable environment. Clas-
sical settings include mean-payoff games, where the objective is to optimize the long-run average gain
per action, and energy games, where the system has to avoid running out of energy.
We study average-energy games, where the goal is to optimize the long-run average of the accumulated
energy. We show that this objective arises naturally in several applications, and that it yields interesting
connections with previous concepts in the literature. We prove that deciding the winner in such games
is in NP ∩ coNP and at least as hard as solving mean-payoff games, and we establish that memoryless
strategies suffice to win. We also consider the case where the system has to minimize the average-energy
while maintaining the accumulated energy within predefined bounds at all times: this corresponds to
operating with a finite-capacity storage for energy. We give results for one-player and two-player games,
and establish complexity bounds and memory requirements.
1 Introduction
Quantitative games. Game-theoretic formulations are a standard tool for the synthesis of provably-
correct controllers for reactive systems [24]. We consider two-player (system vs. environment) turn-based
games played on finite graphs. Vertices of the graph are called states and partitioned into states of player 1
and states of player 2. The game is played by moving a pebble from state to state, along edges in the graph,
and starting from a given initial state. Whenever the pebble is on a state belonging to player i, player i
decides where to move the pebble next, according to his strategy. The infinite path followed by the pebble
is called a play: it represents one possible behavior of the system. A winning objective encodes acceptable
behaviors of the system and can be seen as a set of winning plays. The goal of player 1 is to ensure that the
outcome of the game will be a winning play, whatever the strategy played by his adversary.
To reason about resource constraints and the performance of strategies, quantitative games have been
considered in the literature. See for example [11,3,33], or [34] for an overview. Those games are played on
weighted graphs, where edges are fitted with integer weights modeling rewards or costs. The performance of a
play is evaluated via a payoff function that maps it to the numerical domain. The objective of player 1 is then
to ensure a sufficient payoff with regard to a given threshold value. Seminal classes of quantitative games
include mean-payoff (MP ), total-payoff (TP ) and energy games (EG). In MP games [17,38,26], player 1
has to optimize his long-run average gain per edge taken whereas, in TP games [22,21], player 1 has to
optimize his long-run sum of weights. Energy games [11,6,25] model safety-like properties: the goal is to
ensure that the running sum of weights never drops below zero and/or that it never exceeds a given upper
bound U ∈ N. All three classes share common properties. First, MP games, TP games, and EG games with
only a lower bound (EGL) are memoryless determined (given an initial state, either player 1 has a strategy
to win, or player 2 has one, and in both cases no memory is required to win). Second, deciding the winner
for those games is in NP ∩ coNP and no polynomial algorithm is known despite many efforts (e.g., [9,13]).
Energy games with both lower and upper bounds (EGLU ) are more complex: they are EXPTIME-complete
and winning requires memory in general [6].
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Game objective 1-player 2-player memory
MP P [28] NP ∩ coNP [38] memoryless [17]
TP P [19] NP ∩ coNP [21] memoryless [22]
EGL P [6] NP ∩ coNP [11,6] memoryless [11]
EGLU PSPACE-complete [18] EXPTIME-complete [6] pseudo-polynomial
AE P NP ∩ coNP memoryless
AELU , polynomial U P NP ∩ coNP polynomial
AELU , arbitrary U PSPACE-complete EXPTIME-complete pseudo-polynomial
AEL PSPACE-easy / NP-hard open / EXPTIME-hard open (≥ pseudo-p.)
Table 1: Complexity of deciding the winner and memory requirements for quantitative games:MP stands for
mean-payoff, TP for total-payoff, EGL (resp. EGLU ) for lower-bounded (resp. lower- and upper-bounded)
energy, AE for average-energy, and AEL (resp. AELU ) for average-energy under a lower bound (resp. and
upper bound U ∈ N) on the energy. Results without reference are proved in this paper.
While those classes are well-known, it is sometimes necessary to go beyond them to accurately model
practical applications. For example, multi-dimensional games and conjunctions with a parity objective model
trade-offs between different quantitative aspects [12,15,37]. Similarly, window objectives address the need for
strategies ensuring good quantitative behaviors within reasonable time frames [13].
Average-energy games. We study the average-energy (AE ) payoff function: in AE games, the goal of
player 1 is to optimize the long-run average accumulated energy over a play. We introduce this objective
to formalize the specification desired in a practical application [10], which we detail in the following as a
motivating example. Interestingly, it turns out that this payoff first appeared long ago [36], but it was not
subject to a systematic study until very recently: see related work for more discussion.
In addition to being meaningful w.r.t. practical applications, AE games also have theoretical interest.
In [14], Chatterjee and Prabhu define the average debit-sum level objective, which can be seen as a variation
of the average-energy where the accumulated energy is taken to be zero in any point where it is actually
positive (hence, it focuses on the average debt). They use the corresponding games to compute the values of
quantitative timed simulation functions. In particular, they provide a pseudo-polynomial-time algorithm to
solve those games, but the complexity of deciding the winner as well as the memory requirements are open.
Here, we solve those questions for the very similar average-energy objective.
Motivating example. Our example is a simplified version of the industrial application studied by Cassez
et al. in [10]. Consider a machine that consumes oil, stored in a connected accumulator. We want to synthesize
an appropriate controller to operate the oil pump that fills the accumulator, and by the effect of pressure, that
releases oil from the accumulator into the machine with a (time-varying) rate according to desired production.
In order to ensure safety, the oil level in the accumulator should be maintained at all times between a minimal
and a maximal level. This part of the specification can be encoded as an energy objective with both lower
and upper bounds (EGLU ). At the same time, the more oil (thus pressure) in the accumulator, the faster
the whole apparatus wears out. Hence, an ideal controller should minimize the average level of oil in the long
run. This desire can be formalized through the average-energy payoff (AE ). Overall, the specification is thus
to minimize the average-energy under the strong energy constraints: we denote the corresponding objective
by AELU .
Contributions. Our main results are summarized in Table 1.
A) We establish that the average-energy objective can be seen as a refinement of total-payoff, in the same
sense as total-payoff is seen as a refinement of mean-payoff [21]: it allows to distinguish strategies yielding
identical mean-payoff and total-payoff.
B) We show that deciding the winner in two-player AE games is in NP ∩ coNP whereas it is in P for
one-player games. In both cases, memoryless strategies suffice (Thm. 8). Those complexity bounds match
the state-of-the-art for MP and TP games [38,26,21,9]. Furthermore we prove that AE games are at least
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as hard as mean-payoff games (Thm. 10). Therefore, the NP ∩ coNP-membership can be considered optimal
w.r.t. our knowledge of MP games. Technically, the crux of our approach is as follows. First, we show that
memoryless strategies suffice in one-player AE games (Thm. 6): this requires to prove important properties of
the AE payoff as classical sufficient criteria for memoryless determinacy present in the literature fail to apply
directly. Second, we establish a polynomial-time algorithm for the one-player case: it exploits the structure
of winning strategies and mixes graph techniques with local linear program solving (Thm. 7). Finally, we lift
memoryless determinacy to the two-player case using results by Gimbert and Zielonka [23] and obtain the
NP ∩ coNP-membership as a corollary (Thm. 9).
C) We establish an EXPTIME algorithm to solve two-player AE games with lower- and upper-bounded
energy (AELU ) with an arbitrary upper bound U ∈ N (Thm. 13). It relies on a reduction of the AELU game
to a pseudo-polynomially larger AE game where the energy constraints are encoded in the graph structure.
Applying straightforwardly the AE algorithm on this game would only give us NEXPTIME ∩ coNEXPTIME-
membership, hence we avoid this blowup by further reducing the problem to a particular MP game and
applying a pseudo-polynomial algorithm, with some care to ensure that overall the algorithm only requires
pseudo-polynomial time in the original AELU game. Since the simpler EGLU games (i.e., AELU with a
trivial AE constraint) are already EXPTIME-hard [6], the EXPTIME-membership result is optimal. We also
prove that pseudo-polynomial memory is both sufficient and in general necessary to win in AELU games,
for both players (Thm. 15). We show that one-player AELU games are PSPACE-complete via the on-the-fly
construction of a witness path based on the aforementioned reduction, answering a question left open in [7].
For polynomial (in the size of the game graph) values of the upper bound U—or if it is given in unary—
the complexity of the two-player (resp. one-player) AELU problem collapses to NP ∩ coNP (resp. P) with
the same approach, and polynomial memory suffices for both players.
D) We provide partial answers for the AEL objective—AE under a lower bound constraint on energy but
no upper bound. We show PSPACE-membership for the one-player case (Thm. 18), by reducing the problem
to an AELU game with a sufficiently large upper bound. That is, we prove that if the player can win for the
AEL objective, then he can do so without ever increasing its energy above a well-chosen bound. We also prove
the AEL problem to be at least NP-hard in one-player games (Thm. 18) and EXPTIME-hard in two-player
games (Lem. 21) via reductions from the subset-sum problem and countdown games respectively. Finally,
we show that memory is required for both players in two-player AEL games (Lem. 22), and that pseudo-
polynomial memory is both sufficient and necessary in the one-player case (Thm. 19). The decidability status
of two-player AEL games remains open as we only provide a correct but incomplete incremental algorithm
(Lem. 20). We conjecture that the two-player AEL problem is decidable and sketch a potential approach to
solve it. We highlight the key remaining questions and discuss some connections with related models that
are known to be difficult.
Observe that in many applications, the energy must be stocked in a finite-capacity storage for which an
upper bound is provided. Hence, the model of choice in this case is AELU .
Related work. This paper extends previous work presented in a conference [7]: it gives a full presentation
of the technical details, along with additional results and improved complexities.
The average-energy payoff—Eq. (1)—appeared in a paper by Thuijsman and Vrieze in the late eight-
ies [36], under the name total-reward. This definition is different from the classical total-payoff —see Sect. 2—
commonly studied in the formal methods community (see for example [22,21]), which, despite that, has been
referred in many papers as either total-payoff or total-reward equivalently. We will see in this paper that
both definitions are indeed different and exhibit different behaviors.
Maybe due to this confusion, the payoff of Eq. (1)—which we call average-energy thus avoiding misunder-
standings—was not studied extensively until recently. Nothing was known about memoryless determinacy
and complexity of deciding the winner. Independently to our work, Boros et al. recently studied the same
payoff (under the name total-payoff ). In [5], they study Markov decision processes and stochastic games with
the payoff of Eq. (1) and solve both questions. Their results overlap with ours for AE games (Table 1). Let
us first mention that our results were obtained independently. Second, and most importantly, our approach
and techniques are different, and we believe our take on the problem yields some interest for our community.
Indeed, the algorithm of Boros et al. entirely relies on linear programming in the one-player case, and resorts
to approximation by discounted games in the two-player one. Our techniques are arguably more constructive
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and based on inherent properties of the payoff. In that sense, it is closer to what is usually deemed important
in our field. For example, we provide an extensive comparison with classical payoffs. We base our proof of
memoryless determinacy on operational understanding of the AE which is crucial in order to formalize proper
specifications. Our technique then benefits from seminal works [23] to bypass the reduction to discounted
games and obtain a direct proof, thanks to our more constructive approach. Lastly, while [5] considers the
AE problem in the stochastic context, we focus on the deterministic one but consider multi-criteria exten-
sions by adding bounds on the energy (AELU and AEL games). Those extensions are completely new, exhibit
theoretical interest and are adequate for practical applications in constrained energy systems, as witnessed
by the case study of [10].
Recent work of Bra´zdil et al. [8] considers the optimization of a payoff under energy constraint. They
study mean-payoff in consumption systems, i.e., simplified one-player energy games where all edges consume
energy but some states can atomically produce a reload of the energy up to the allowed capacity.
2 Preliminaries
Graph games. We consider turn-based games played on graphs between two players denoted by P1 and P2.
A game is a tuple G = (S1, S2,E ,w) where (i) S1 and S2 are disjoint finite sets of states belonging to P1
and P2, with S = S1⊎S2, (ii) E ⊆ S×S is a finite set of edges such that for all s ∈ S, there exists s
′ ∈ S such
that (s, s′) ∈ E (i.e., no deadlock), and (iii) w : E → Z is an integer weight function. Given edge (s1, s2) ∈ E ,
we write w(s1, s2) as a shortcut for w((s1, s2)). We denote by W the largest absolute weight assigned by
function w . A game is called 1-player if S1 = ∅ or S2 = ∅.
A play from an initial state sinit ∈ S is an infinite sequence π = s0s1 . . . sn . . . such that s0 = sinit and for
all i ≥ 0 we have (si, si+1) ∈ E . The (finite) prefix of π up to position n gives the sequence π(n) = s0s1 . . . sn,
the first (resp. last) element s0 (resp. sn) is denoted first(π(n)) (resp. last(π(n))). The set of all plays in G
is denoted by Plays(G) and the set of all prefixes is denoted by Prefs(G). We say that a prefix ρ ∈ Prefs(G)
belongs to Pi, i ∈ {1, 2}, if last(ρ) ∈ Si. The set of prefixes that belong to Pi is denoted by Prefs i(G). The
classical concatenation between prefixes (resp. prefix and play) is denoted by the · operator. The length of
a non-empty prefix ρ = s0 . . . sn is defined as the number of edges and denoted by |ρ| = n.
Payoffs of plays. Given a play π = s0s1 . . . sn . . . we define
– its energy level at position n as EL(π(n)) =
∑n−1
i=0 w(si, si+1);
– its mean-payoff as MP(π) = lim supn→∞
1
n
∑n−1
i=0 w(si, si+1) = lim supn→∞
1
n
EL(π(n));
– its total-payoff as TP (π) = lim supn→∞
∑n−1
i=0 w(si, si+1) = lim supn→∞ EL(π(n));
– and its average-energy as
AE (π) = lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
i−1∑
j=0
w(sj , sj+1)
 = lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
EL(π(i)). (1)
We will sometimes consider those measures defined with lim inf instead of lim sup, in which case we write
MP , TP and AE respectively. Finally, we also consider those measures over prefixes: we naturally define
them by dropping the lim supn→∞ operator and taking n = |ρ| for a prefix ρ ∈ Prefs(G). In this case, we
simply write MP(ρ), TP(ρ) and AE (ρ) to denote the fact that we consider finite sequences.
Strategies. A strategy for Pi, i ∈ {1, 2}, is a function σi : Prefs i(G)→ S such that for all ρ ∈ Prefs i(G) we
have (last(ρ), σi(ρ)) ∈ E . A strategy σi for Pi is finite-memory if it can be encoded by a deterministic Moore
machine (M,m0, αu, αn) whereM is a finite set of states (the memory of the strategy), m0 ∈M is the initial
memory state, αu : M × S → M is an update function, and αn : M × Si → S is the next-action function.
If the game is in s ∈ Si and m ∈ M is the current memory value, then the strategy chooses s′ = αn(m, s)
as the next state of the game. When the game leaves a state s ∈ S, the memory is updated to αu(m, s).
Formally, (M,m0, αu, αn) defines the strategy σi such that σi(ρ · s) = αn(αˆu(m0, ρ), s) for all ρ ∈ S∗ and
s ∈ Si, where αˆu extends αu to sequences of states as expected. A strategy is memoryless if |M | = 1, i.e., it
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does not depend on the history but only on the current state of the game. We denote by Σi(G), the sets of
strategies for player Pi. We drop G when the context is clear.
A play π = s0s1 . . . is consistent with a strategy σi of Pi if, for all n ≥ 0 where last(π(n)) ∈ Si, we have
σi(π(n)) = sn+1. Given an initial state sinit ∈ S and strategies σ1 and σ2 for the two players, we denote by
Outcome(sinit, σ1, σ2) the unique play that starts in sinit and is consistent with both σ1 and σ2. When fixing
the strategy of only Pi, we denote the set of consistent outcomes by Outcomes(sinit, σi).
Objectives. An objective in G is a set W ⊆ Plays(G) that is declared winning for P1. Given a game G,
an initial state sinit, and an objective W , a strategy σ1 ∈ Σ1 is winning for P1 if for all strategy σ2 ∈ Σ2, we
have that Outcome(sinit, σ1, σ2) ∈ W . Symmetrically, a strategy σ2 ∈ Σ2 is winning for P2 if for all strategy
σ1 ∈ Σ1, we have that Outcome(sinit, σ1, σ2) 6∈ W . That is, we consider zero-sum games.
We consider the following objectives and combinations of those objectives.
– Given an initial energy level cinit ∈ N, the lower-bounded energy (EGL) objective EnergyL(cinit) =
{π ∈ Plays(G) | ∀n ≥ 0, cinit + EL(π(n)) ≥ 0} requires non-negative energy at all times.
– Given an upper bound U ∈ N and an initial energy level cinit ∈ N, the lower- and upper-bounded
energy (EGLU ) objective EnergyLU (U, cinit) = {π ∈ Plays(G) | ∀n ≥ 0, cinit + EL(π(n)) ∈ [0, U ]}
requires that the energy always remains non-negative and below the upper bound U along a play.
– Given a threshold t ∈ Q, the mean-payoff (MP ) objective MeanPayoff (t) = {π ∈ Plays(G) | MP(π) ≤
t} requires that the mean-payoff is at most t.
– Given a threshold t ∈ Z, the total-payoff (TP) objective TotalPayoff (t) = {π ∈ Plays(G) | TP(π) ≤ t}
requires that the total-payoff is at most t.
– Given a threshold t ∈ Q, the average-energy (AE ) objective AvgEnergy(t) = {π ∈ Plays(G) | AE (π) ≤
t} requires that the average-energy is at most t.
For the MP , TP and AE objectives, note that P1 aims to minimize the payoff value while P2 tries to
maximize it. The reversed convention is also often used in the literature but both are equivalent. For our
motivating example, seeing P1 as a minimizer is more natural. Note that we define the objectives using the
lim sup variants of MP , TP and AE , but similar results are obtained for the lim inf variants.
Decision problem. Given a game G, an initial state sinit ∈ S, and an objective W ⊆ Plays(G) as defined
above, the associated decision problem is to decide if P1 has a winning strategy for this objective.
We recall classical results in Table 1. Memoryless strategies suffice for both players for EGL [11,6],MP [17]
and TP [19,22] objectives. Since all associated problems can be solved in polynomial time for 1-player games,
it follows that the 2-player decision problem is in NP ∩ coNP for those three objectives [6,38,21]. For the
EGLU objective, memory is in general needed and the associated decision problem is EXPTIME-complete [6]
(PSPACE-complete for one-player games [18]).
Game values. Given a game with an objectiveW ∈ {MeanPayoff ,TotalPayoff ,AvgEnergy} and an initial
state sinit, we refer to the value from sinit as v = inf{t ∈ Q | ∃σ1 ∈ Σ1, Outcomes(sinit, σ1) ⊆ W(t)}. For both
MP and TP objectives, it is known that the value can be achieved by an optimal memoryless strategy; for
the AE objective it follows from our results (Thm. 8).
3 Average-Energy
In this section, we consider the problem of ensuring a sufficiently low average-energy.
Problem 1 (AE) Given a game G, an initial state sinit, and a threshold t ∈ Q, decide if P1 has a winning
strategy σ1 ∈ Σ1 for the objective AvgEnergy(t).
We first compare the AE objective with traditional quantitative objectives and study how they can
be connected (Sect. 3.1). Then we want to establish that in AE games, memoryless strategies are always
sufficient to play optimally, for both players. Interestingly, this result cannot be obtained by straightforward
application of many well-known sufficient criteria for memoryless determinacy existing in the literature.
We thus introduce some technical lemmas that highlight the inherent features of the AE payoff function
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(Sect. 3.2) and permit to prove the result for one-player AE games (Sect. 3.3). We then prove that one-
player AE games can be solved in polynomial-time via an algorithm combining graph analysis techniques
with linear programming. Finally, we consider the two-player case (Sect. 3.4). Applying a result by Gimbert
and Zielonka [23], combined with our results on the one-player case, we derive memoryless determinacy of
two-player AE games. This also induces NP ∩ coNP-membership of the AE problem by the P algorithm of
Sect. 3.3. We conclude by proving that AE games are at least as hard as MP games, hence indicating that
the NP∩coNP upper bound is essentially optimal with regard to our current knowledge of MP games (whose
membership to P is a long-standing open problem [38,26,9,13]).
3.1 Relation with classical objectives
Several links between EGL,MP and TP objectives can be established. Intuitively, P1 can only ensure a lower
bound on energy if he can prevent P2 from enforcing strictly-negative cycles (otherwise the initial energy is
eventually exhausted). This is the case if and only if P1 can ensure a non-negative mean-payoff in G (here,
he wants to maximize the MP), and if this is the case, P1 can prevent the running sum of weights from
ever going too far below zero along a play, hence granting a lower bound on total-payoff. We introduce the
sign-reversed game G ′ in the next lemma, which is consistent with our view of P1 as a minimizer with regard
to payoffs (as discussed in Sect. 2).
Lemma 1. Let G = (S1, S2,E ,w) be a game and sinit ∈ S be the initial state. The following assertions are
equivalent.
A. There exists cinit ∈ N such that P1 has a (memoryless) winning strategy for objective EnergyL(cinit).
B. Player P1 has a (memoryless) winning strategy for objective MeanPayoff (0) in the game G ′ defined by
reversing the sign of the weight function, i.e., for all (s1, s2) ∈ E, w ′(s1, s2) = −w(s1, s2).
C. Player P1 has a (memoryless) winning strategy for objective TotalPayoff (t), with t = 2 · (|S| − 1) ·W , in
the game G ′ defined by reversing the sign of the weight function.
D. There exists t ∈ Z such that P1 has a (memoryless) winning strategy for objective TotalPayoff (t), in the
game G ′ defined by reversing the sign of the weight function.
Proof. Proof of A⇔ B is given in [6, Proposition 12]. Proof of B ⇔ C ⇔ D is in [13, Lem. 1]. ⊓⊔
The TP objective is sometimes seen as a refinement of MP for the case where P1—as a minimizer—can
ensureMP equal to zero but not lower, i.e., the MP game has value zero [21]. Indeed, one may use the TP to
further discriminate between strategies that guarantee MP zero. In the same philosophy, the average-energy
can help in distinguishing strategies that yield identical total-payoffs. See Fig. 1. The AE values in both
examples can be computed easily using the upcoming technical lemmas (Sect. 3.2).
In these examples, the average-energy is clearly comprised between the infimum and supremum total-
payoffs. This remains true for any play.
Lemma 2. For any play π ∈ Plays(G), we have that AE (π),AE (π) ∈
[
TP(π),TP (π)
]
⊆ R ∪ {−∞,∞}.
Proof. Consider a play π ∈ Plays(G). By definition of the total-payoff and thanks to weights taking integer
values, we have that there exists some index m ∈ N0 such that, for all n ≥ m, EL(π(n)) ∈
[
TP (π),TP (π)
]
.
By definition, the average-energy AE (resp. AE ) measures the supremum (resp. infinimum) limit of the
averages of those partial sums, hence it holds that AE (π),AE (π) ∈
[
TP(π),TP (π)
]
. ⊓⊔
In particular, if the mean-payoff value from a state is not zero, its total-payoff value is infinite and the
following lemma holds.
Lemma 3. Let G = (S1, S2,E ,w) be a game and sinit ∈ S be the initial state.
1. If there exists t < 0 such that P1 has a (memoryless) winning strategy for MeanPayoff (t), then P1 has a
memoryless strategy that is winning for AvgEnergy(t′) for all t′ ∈ Q, i.e., this strategy ensures that any
consistent outcome π is such that AE (π) = AE (π) = −∞.
6
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AE=3
(c) Play pi1 sees energy levels
(1, 3, 5, 3)ω.
Step
Energy
0
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AE=11/3
(d) Play pi2 sees energy levels
(1, 3, 5, 5, 5, 3)ω.
Fig. 1: Both plays have identical mean-payoff and total-payoff:MP(π1) = MP(π1) = MP(π2) = MP(π2) = 0,
TP(π1) = TP (π2) = 5, and TP(π1) = TP(π2) = 1. But play π1 has a lower average-energy: AE (π1) =
AE (π1) = 3 < AE (π2) = AE (π2) = 11/3.
2. If P1 has no (memoryless) winning strategy for MeanPayoff (0), then, for any t′ ∈ Q, P1 has no winning
strategy for AvgEnergy(t′). In particular, P2 has a memoryless strategy ensuring that any consistent
outcome π is such that AE (π) = AE (π) =∞.
Proof. Consider the first implication. Assume P1 has a memoryless strategy σ1 ensuring that all consistent
outcomes π ∈ Outcomes(sinit, σ1) are such that MP(π) < 0. For any such outcome, it is guaranteed that
all simple cycles have a strictly negative energy level. Thus, we have that TP(π) = −∞, and by Lem. 2, it
implies that AE (π) = −∞, as claimed. Since AE (π) ≤ AE (π) by definition, the property holds.
Now consider the second implication. Assume there exists no winning strategy for P1 for the mean-
payoff objective. By equivalence B ⇔ D of Lem. 1, and memoryless determinacy of total-payoff games (see
for example [22]), it follows that P2 has a memoryless strategy σ2 ensuring that all consistent outcomes
π ∈ Outcomes(sinit, σ2) are such that TP(π) =∞. By Lem. 2, this induces the claim. ⊓⊔
3.2 Useful properties of the average-energy
In this subsection, we will first review some classical criteria that usually prove sufficient to deduce memo-
ryless determinacy in quantitative games and discuss why they cannot be applied straight out of the box to
the average-energy payoff. We will then prove two useful properties of this payoff that will later help us to
prove the desired result.
Classical sufficient criteria. We briefly discuss traditional approaches to prove memoryless determinacy
in quantitative games. The first one is to study a variant of the infinite-duration game where the game halts
as soon as a cycle is closed and then to relate the properties of this variant to the infinite-duration game. This
technique was used in the original proof of memoryless determinacy for mean-payoff games by Ehrenfeucht
and Mycielski [17], and in a following simpler proof by Bjo¨rklund et al. [2]. The connection between infinite-
duration games and so-called first cycle games was recently streamlined by Aminof and Rubin [1], identifying
sufficient conditions to prove that first cycle games and their infinite-duration counterparts admit optimal
memoryless strategies for both players. Among those conditions is the need for winning objectives to be
closed under cyclic permutation (intuitively, swapping cycles in a play should not induce a better payoff)
and under concatenation (intuitively, concatenating two prefixes should not result in a payoff better than the
best of the two prefixes). Without further assumptions, the average-energy objective satisfies neither. Indeed,
consider individual cycles represented by sequences of weights C1 = {−1}, C2 = {1} and C3 = {1,−2}. We
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see that AE (C1C2) = (−1+0)/2 = −1/2 < AE (C2C1) = (1−0)/2 = 1/2, hence AE is not closed under cyclic
permutations. Intuitively, the order in which the weights are seen does matter, in contrast to most classical
payoffs. For concatenation, see that AE (C3) = 0 while AE (C3C3) = −1/2 < 0. Here the intuition is that the
overall AE is impacted by the energy of the first cycle which is strictly negative (−1). In a sense, the AE
of a cycle can only be maintained through repetition if this cycle is neutral with regard to the total energy
level, i.e., if it has energy level zero: we will formalize this intuition in Lem. 5.
Other criteria for memoryless determinacy or half-memoryless determinacy (i.e., holding only for one of
the two players) respectively appear in works by Gimbert and Zielonka [22] and by Kopczynski [29]. They
involve checking that the payoff is fairly mixing, or concave. Again, both are false for arbitrary sequences of
weights in the case of the average-energy, for essentially the same reasons as above. Nevertheless, we will be
able to prove that memoryless strategies suffice for both players using similar ideas but first taking care of
the problematic cases. Intuitively, when those cases are dealt with, we will regain a payoff that satisfies the
above conditions. We also obtain monotonicity and selectivity of the payoff function as defined in [23].
Extraction of prefixes. The following lemma describes the impact of adding a finite prefix to an infinite
play. We prove that the average-energy over a play can be decomposed w.r.t. to the energy level of any of
its prefixes and the average-energy of the remaining suffix.
Lemma 4 (Average-energy prefix). Let ρ ∈ Prefs(G), π ∈ Plays(G). Then, AE (ρ ·π) = EL(ρ)+AE(π).
The same equality holds for AE.
Proof. Let ρ = s0 . . . sk ∈ Prefs(G) and π ∈ Plays(G) be a prefix and a play over a game G. We prove the
property for AE . By definition and decomposition, we have that
AE (ρ · π) = lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
EL((ρ · π)(i))
= lim sup
n→∞
[
1
n
·
k∑
i=1
EL(ρ(i)) +
1
n
·
n∑
i=k+1
EL(ρ) +
1
n
·
n∑
i=k+1
EL(π(i − k))
]
.
For clarity, we rewrite this expression as AE (ρ ·π) = lim supn→∞ [X1(n) +X2(n) +X3(n)], maintaining the
same order.
Since k is fixed and finite, and EL(ρ(i)) is bounded for all i ≤ k, we have that lim supn→∞X1(n) =
limn→∞X1(n) = 0. Furthermore, for n ≥ k+1, we rewrite the second term as X2(n) = (n−k−1) ·EL(ρ)/n,
and it follows that lim supn→∞X2(n) = limn→∞X2(n) = EL(ρ). Since both sequences X1(n) and X2(n)
converge, we can write
lim inf
n→∞
X1(n) + lim inf
n→∞
X2(n) + lim sup
n→∞
X3(n) ≤ AE (ρ · π) ≤ lim sup
n→∞
X1(n) + lim sup
n→∞
X2(n) + lim sup
n→∞
X3(n).
Hence, by a small change of variable,
AE (ρ · π) = EL(ρ) + lim sup
n→∞
X3(n) = EL(ρ) + lim sup
n→∞
[
1
n
·
n−k−1∑
i=1
EL(π(i))
]
= EL(ρ) +AE (π),
as, in the limit, the (k + 1) missing terms in the sum are negligible. The proof for AE is similar. ⊓⊔
Extraction of a best cycle. The next lemma is crucial to prove that memoryless strategies suffice: under
well-chosen conditions, one can always select a best cycle in a play—hence, there is no interest in mixing
different cycles and no use for memory. It holds only for sequences of cycles that have energy level zero:
since they do not change the energy, they do not modify the AE of the following suffix of play, and one can
decompose the AE as a weighted average over zero cycles.
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Lemma 5 (Repeated zero cycles of bounded length). Let C1, C2, C3, . . . be an infinite sequence of
cycles Ci ∈ Prefs(G) such that (i) π = C1 · C2 · C3 · · · ∈ Plays(G),4 (ii) ∀ i ≥ 1, EL(Ci) = 0 and (iii)
∃ ℓ ∈ N>0 such that ∀ i ≥ 1, |Ci| ≤ ℓ. Then the following properties hold.
1. The average-energy of π is the weighted average of the average-energies of the cycles:
AE (π) = lim sup
k→∞
[∑k
i=1 |Ci| ·AE (Ci)∑k
i=1 |Ci|
]
. (2)
2. For any cycle C ∈ Prefs(G) such that EL(C) = 0, we have that AE (Cω) = AE (C).
3. Repeating the best cycle gives the lowest AE: infi∈N>0 AE (Ci) = infi∈N>0 AE ((Ci)
ω) ≤ AE (π).
Similar properties hold for AE.
Observe that since we assume a bound ℓ ∈ N>0 on the length of cycles, and the game is played on a
finite graph, Point 3 of Lem. 5 does actually allow to select a best cycle: the set of possible cycles of length
at most ℓ is finite and the infimum is reached, hence can be replaced by the miminum.
Proof. We prove the three points for AE , similar arguments can be applied for AE . Consider Point 1. Let
π = s10 . . . s
1
|C1|
s21 . . . s
2
|C2|
s31 . . . where s
i
j denotes the j-th state of cycle Ci, with C1 = s
1
0 . . . s
1
|C1|
and for all
i > 1, Ci = s
i−1
|Ci−1|
si1 . . . s
i
|Ci|
. Essentially, si−1|Ci−1| is both the last state of Ci−1 and the first one of Ci: it can
also be seen as si0 and we later use both notations depending on the role we consider for this state. Given
index k ∈ N of a state sk in the classical formulation π = s0s1s2 . . . such that sk denotes state sij in our new
formulation π = s10 . . . s
1
|C1|
s21 . . . s
2
|C2|
s31 . . . , we define c(k) = i and p(k) = j, respectively denoting the index
of the corresponding cycle and the position of state sk within this cycle. We can rewrite the definition of the
average-energy of π as
AE (π) = lim sup
n→∞
[
1
n
n∑
k=1
EL(π(k))
]
= lim sup
n→∞
 1
n
c(n)−1∑
i=1
|Ci|∑
j=1
EL(s10 . . . s
i
j) +
p(n)∑
j=1
EL(s10 . . . s
c(n)
j )
 . (3)
Now observe that since all cycles are such that EL(Ci) = 0, we have that EL(s10 . . . s
i
j) = EL(s
i
0 . . . s
i
j) for all
indices i ∈ N>0, j ∈ {1, . . . , |Ci|}. In other words, the energy level in a given position only depends on the
current cycle. Hence, for all i ∈ N>0,
|Ci|∑
j=1
EL(s10 . . . s
i
j) =
|Ci|∑
j=1
EL(si0 . . . s
i
j) = |Ci| · AE (Ci)
where the second equality follows by definition of AE (Ci). Therefore, Eq. (3) becomes
AE (π) = lim sup
n→∞
 1
n
c(n)−1∑
i=1
|Ci| ·AE (Ci) +
p(n)∑
j=1
EL(s
c(n)
0 . . . s
c(n)
j )
 .
Recall that, by hypothesis, there exists ℓ ∈ N>0 such that for all i ≥ 1, |Ci| ≤ ℓ. Observe that the boundedness
of cycles length implies that (a) p(n) ≤ ℓ, (b)
∑p(n)
j=1 EL(s
c(n)
0 . . . s
c(n)
j ) is bounded, and (c)
∑c(n)−1
i=1 |Ci| ≤
n =
∑c(n)−1
i=1 |Ci|+ p(n) ≤
∑c(n)−1
i=1 |Ci|+ ℓ. Combining those three arguments, we obtain that
lim sup
n→∞
[∑c(n)−1
i=1 |Ci| · AE (Ci)∑c(n)−1
i=1 |Ci|+ ℓ
]
≤ AE (π) ≤ lim sup
n→∞
[∑c(n)−1
i=1 |Ci| ·AE (Ci)∑c(n)−1
i=1 |Ci|
]
4 We slightly abuse the notation as we see cycles as sequences of edges. The concatenation of cycles Ca = s s
′ . . . s
and Cb = s s
′′ . . . s is to be understood as its natural interpretation Ca · Cb = s s
′ . . . s s′′ . . . s: the origin state s only
appears once in the middle and not twice as it would with Ca and Cb seen as true sequences of states.
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Hence,
AE (π) = lim sup
k→∞
[∑k
i=1 |Ci| ·AE (Ci)∑k
i=1 |Ci|
]
as claimed by Point 1.
Now consider Point 2. For any cycle C ∈ Prefs(G) such that EL(C) = 0, all three hypotheses (i), (ii),
and (iii) are clearly satisfied, with ℓ = |C|. Hence by Point 1, we have that
AE (Cω) = lim sup
k→∞
[
k · |C| ·AE (C)
k · |C|
]
= AE (C).
Finally, we prove Point 3. The equality straightforwardly follows from Point 2. It remains to consider the
inequality. By definition of the infimum, we have that, for all k ≥ 1,
inf
i∈N>0
AE (Ci) =
∑k
i=1 |Ci| · infi∈N>0 AE (Ci)∑k
i=1 |Ci|
≤
∑k
i=1 |Ci| ·AE (Ci)∑k
i=1 |Ci|
.
Hence by taking the limit, we obtain
inf
i∈N>0
AE (Ci) = lim sup
k→∞
[
inf
i∈N>0
AE (Ci)
]
≤ lim sup
k→∞
[∑k
i=1 |Ci| ·AE (Ci)∑k
i=1 |Ci|
]
= AE (π).
This concludes our proof. ⊓⊔
3.3 One-player games
We assume that the unique player is P1, hence that S2 = ∅. The proofs are similar for the case where all
states belong to P2 (i.e., S1 = ∅). Similarly, we present our results for the AE variant, but they carry over to
the AE one. Actually, since we show that we can restrict ourselves to memoryless strategies, all consistent
outcomes will be periodic and thus both variants will be equal over those outcomes.
Memoryless determinacy. Intuitively, we use Lem. 4 and Lem. 5 to transform any arbitrary path into
a simple lasso path, repeating a unique simple cycle, yielding an AE at least as good, thus proving that any
threshold achievable with memory can also be achieved without it.
Theorem 6. Memoryless strategies are sufficient to win one-player AE games.
Proof. As a preliminary step, we check whether the graph contains a reachable strictly negative cycle, e.g.,
using the Bellman-Ford algorithm in O(|S| · |T |)-time. If so, then P1 can ensure a strictly negative mean-
payoff, and by Point 1 of Lem. 3, a memoryless strategy exists to make the average-energy be −∞: such a
strategy consists in reaching and repeating the negative simple cycle forever.
Now, assume that the graph contains no (reachable) strictly negative cycle. If the graph also contains
no zero cycle, then the energy level necessarily diverges to +∞, and the average-energy is +∞ along any
run. Indeed, we are in the case of Point 2 of Lem. 3. Any strategy is optimal in that case: in particular, any
memoryless strategy is.
For the rest of this proof, we consider the remaining case of graphs that contain no reachable strictly
negative cycle, but that do contain zero cycles. We will prove that memoryless strategies suffice for P1 in
those games, by induction on the number of choices of P1. Given a game G = (S1, S2 = ∅,E ,w), we define
dG = |E | − |S|. Since we assume graphs to be deadlock-free, we have that dG ≥ 0 for any game G. We
consider induction on the value dG . For every game G such that dG = 0 and initial state sinit ∈ S, P1 wins
for the AE objective for threshold t ∈ Q iff he wins with a memoryless strategy: indeed, P1 actually has no
choice at all in G, which is reduced to a unique outcome from sinit.
Now assume that memoryless strategies suffice for P1 in every game G such that dG ≤ m for somem ∈ N.
We claim that they also suffice in every game G such that dG = m+1. Observe that if this holds, we are done
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as it proves that memoryless strategies suffice for P1 in all one-player AE games. Let G be such a game with
dG = m+1. Recall that in G = (S1, S2 = ∅,E ,w) there is no strictly negative cycle by hypothesis. Let s be a
state of G such that s has at least two outgoing edges. Such a state necessarily exists since dG ≥ 1. Consider
a partition of the outgoing edges of s in two non-empty sets A, B such that A⊎B = {(s1, s2) ∈ E | s1 = s}.
According to this partition, we can define in the natural way two sub-games GA = (S1, S2 = ∅,E \ B,w)
and GB = (S1, S2 = ∅,E \A,w) such that dGA ≤ m and dGB ≤ m. By induction hypothesis, we know that
memoryless strategies suffice to play optimally for the AE objective in those two sub-games. First, observe
that if P1 has a memoryless winning strategy σ in either GA or GB for threshold t ∈ Q, then this strategy
remains winning in G. What we need to show is that if P1 cannot win in both GA and GB, then he also
cannot win in G, even using memory in s: in the following, we assume that P1 is memoryless in any other
state s′ 6= s (following the induction hypothesis) and we show that mixing cycles in s does not help him.
By contradiction, assume that P1 cannot win in both GA and GB, but he has a winning strategy σ in
G, for the same threshold t. Let π be the outcome consistent with σ. Two cases are possible.
First, state s is seen finitely often along π. In this case, we apply Lemma 4 repeatedly on π to iteratively
remove all cycles on s. Since there is no strictly negative cycle in G, we know that removing one cycle cannot
increase the average-energy of the play (it either stays the same if the cycle is a zero cycle, or decreases
if it is a strictly positive one). Since s is seen finitely often, we eventually obtain a play π′ that sees s at
most once. Therefore, this play either belongs to GA or GB (both if s is never visited). Furthermore, it has
average-energy at most t by construction. This contradicts the claim that P1 has no winning strategy in
both sub-games and concludes the proof in this case.
Second, state s is seen infinitely often along π. Since P1 is memoryless outside s, π only contains simple
cycles and can be written as π = ρ · C1 · C2 · C3 · · · where ρ is an acyclic prefix ending in s and for all i ≥ 1,
Ci is a simple cycle on s. Observe that every cycle Ci belongs either to GA or to GB. Furthermore, since π is
winning and there is no strictly negative cycle in G, only finitely many indices i1, . . . , ik may correspond to a
strictly positive cycle. With the same reasoning as above (repeated application of Lemma 4), we have that the
play π′ = ρ · Cik+1 · Cik+2 · · · , obtained by removing the first cycles up to index ik, necessarily has a lower or
equal average-energy: hence it is also winning. Now observe that the sequence of cycles π′′ = Cik+1 · Cik+2 · · ·
may still involve simple cycles from both GA and GB. Still, as all cycles are of length at most |S|, and are
zero cycles, we can apply Lemma 5 to extract one best cycle Cj, j > ik. Putting all this together, we have
that π′′′ = ρ · (Cj)ω is such that AE (π′′′) ≤ AE (π). Furthermore, π′′′ is a simple lasso path that belongs
either to GA or to GB (as it now uses a unique outgoing edge from s). Consequently, π
′′′ describes a winning
strategy in one of the sub-games, which contradicts our hypothesis and concludes our proof in this case too.
⊓⊔
Polynomial-time algorithm. We now know the form of optimal memoryless strategies: an optimal lasso
path π = ρ · Cω w.r.t. the AE . We establish a polynomial-time algorithm to solve one-player AE games.
The crux of our algorithm consists in computing, for each state s, the best—w.r.t. the AE — zero cycle Cs
starting and ending in s (if any). This is achieved through linear programming (LP) over expanded graphs.
For each state s and length k ∈ {1, . . . , |S|}, we compute the best cycle Cs,k by considering a graph (Fig. 2)
that models all cycles of length k from s and that uses k+ 1 levels and two-dimensional weights on edges of
the form (c, l · c) where c is the weight in the original game and l ∈ {k, k − 1, . . . , 1} is the level of the edge.
In the LP, we look for cycles Cs,k of length k on s such that (a) the sum of weights in the first dimension is
zero (thus Cs,k is a zero cycle), and (b) the sum in the second one is minimal. Fortunately, this sum is exactly
equal to AE (C) · k thanks to the l factors used in the weights of the expanded graph. Hence, we obtain the
optimal cycle Cs,k (in polynomial time). Doing this |S| times for each state s, we obtain for each of them the
optimal cycle Cs (if one zero cycle exists). Then, by Lem. 4, it remains to compute the least EL with which
each state s can be reached using classical graph techniques (e.g., Bellman-Ford), and to pick the optimal
combination to obtain an optimal memoryless strategy, in polynomial time.
Theorem 7. The AE problem for one-player games is in P.
Proof. Let sinit be the initial state and t ∈ Q be the threshold. From Thm. 6, we can restrict our search to
memoryless strategies achieving average-energy less than or equal to t. As noted in the proof of Thm. 6, if
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s′ s s′′
1 1
−1−1
(a) Original game.
(s,2)
(s′,1)
(s′′,1)
(s,0)
(−1,−2)
(1,2)
(1,1)
(−1,−1)
(b) Expanded graph for k = 2.
Fig. 2: The best cycle Cs,2 is computed by looking for a path from (s, 2) to (s, 0) with sum zero in the first
dimension (zero cycle) and minimal sum in the second dimension (minimal AE ). Here, the cycle via s′ is
clearly better, with AE equal to −1/2 in contrast to 1/2 via s′′.
a strictly negative simple cycle exists and can be reached from sinit, then the answer to the AE problem is
clearly Yes, as average-energy −∞ is achievable. Checking if such a cycle exists and is reachable can be done
in cubic time in the number of states (e.g., using Bellman-Ford to detect negative cycles).
Hence, we now assume that no negative cycle exists. The main part of our algorithm consists in computing,
for each state s, the least average-energy that can be achieved along a simple zero cycle starting and ending
in s (if any). Indeed, strictly positive cycles should be avoided as there is no negative cycle to counteract
them. Applying Lem. 4, it then remains to compute the least energy level with which each state s can be
reached (simple paths are sufficient as there are no negative cycles), and to pick the optimal combination.
Again, this last part can be solved by using classical graph algorithms in cubic time in |S|.
We now focus on computing the best zero cycle from a state s. This is achieved by enumerating the
possible lengths, from 1 to |S| (simple cycles suffice). For a fixed length k, we consider a new graph Gs,k,
made of k+1 copies of the original game G. The states of Gs,k are pairs (u, l) with u ∈ S and 0 ≤ l ≤ k. The
new graph is arranged in levels, indexed from l = k for the top one to l = 0 for the bottom one: l represents
the number of steps remaining to close the cycle of length k. For each edge (u, u′) of G, with w(u, u′) = c,
and for each 1 ≤ l ≤ k, except if both u′ = s and l < k (in order to rule out intermediary visits to s), there
is an edge from (u, l) to (u′, l − 1). This edge carries a pair of weights (c, l · c). Our aim is to find a path in
this graph from (s, k) to (s, 0) (hence this is a simple cycle of length k) such that the sum of the weights
on the first dimension is zero (hence this is a zero cycle) and the sum on the second dimension is minimized
(when divided by k, this sum is precisely the average-energy, if starting from energy level zero).
This problem can be expressed as a linear program, with variables xu,u′,l for each edge u → u′ and
each 1 ≤ l ≤ k. While they are not required to take integer values, these variables are intended to represent
the number of times the edge from (u, l) to (u′, l− 1) is taken along a “path” in Gs,k. The linear program is
as follows:
minimize
∑
xu,u′,l · l · w(u, u′) subject to
1. 0 ≤ xu,u′,l ≤ 1 for all xu,u′,l;
2. for all (u, l) with 1 ≤ l ≤ k − 1,
∑
u′ xu′,u,l+1 =
∑
u′ xu,u′,l;
3.
∑
u′ xs,u′,k =
∑
u′ xu′,s,1 = 1;
4.
∑
xu,u′,l · w(u, u′) = 0;
5.
∑
xu,u′,l ≥ 1.
Condition (2) states that each state has the same amount of “incoming” and “outgoing” flow. Condition (3)
expresses the fact that we start and end up in state s. Condition (4) encodes the fact that we are looking
for zero cycles, and Condition (5) rules out the (possible) trivial solution where all variables are zero.
First observe that if this LP has no solution, then there is no zero cycle of length k from s. Now,
assume it has a solution (x0u,u′,l): this solution minimizes
∑
xu,u′,l · l ·w(u, u′). Consider a sequence of edges
s = uk → uk−1 → · · · → u1 → u0 = s for which xul,ul−1,l > 0 for all l. The existence of such a sequence
easily follows from Conditions (2) and (3). Assume that this is not a zero cycle. As there are no negative
cycles, then this must be a positive cycle. But in order to fulfill Condition (4), we would need a negative
cycle to compensate for this positive cycle, hence implying contradiction. We conclude that any sequence
of consecutive edges as selected above is a zero cycle. Similarly, there cannot be a zero cycle of length k
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from s with better average-energy, as this would contradict the optimality of this solution. We thus have
obtained an average-energy-optimal simple zero cycle of length k from s, in polynomial time. Indeed, the
LP is polynomial in the size of Gs,k, itself polynomial in the size of the original game: the expanded graph
has its size bounded by |S| · (k + 1) and all weights are bounded by k ·W with k ≤ |S| and W the largest
absolute weight in the original game.
As discussed above, this process can be repeated for each state s and each length k, 1 ≤ k ≤ |S|, hence
at most |S|2 times. For each state, we select the best cycle among the |S| possible ones (one for each length).
Therefore, in polynomial time, we get a description of the best cycles w.r.t. the average-energy, for each
s ∈ S. Clearly if no such cycle exists, then the answer to the AE problem is No, as all cycles are strictly
positive and the average-energy of any play will be +∞. If some exist, we can find an optimal strategy by
picking the best combination between such a cycle from a state s and a corresponding prefix from sinit to s
of minimal energy level. As presented before, this is achieved in polynomial time. Then the answer to the
AE problem is Yes if and only if this optimal combination yields average-energy at most equal to t. This
concludes our proof. ⊓⊔
3.4 Two-player games
Memoryless determinacy. We now prove that memoryless strategies still suffice in two-player games.
As discussed in Sect. 3.2, most classical criteria do not apply. There is, however, one result that proves
particularly useful. Consider any payoff function such that memoryless strategies suffice for both one-player
versions (S1 = ∅, resp. S2 = ∅). In [23, Cor. 7], Gimbert and Zielonka establish that memoryless strategies
also suffice in two-player games with the same payoff. Thanks to Thm. 6, this entails the next theorem.
Theorem 8. Average-energy games are determined and both players have memoryless optimal strategies.
Observe that this result is true for both variants of the average-energy payoff function, namely AE and
AE . When both players play optimally, they can restrict themselves to memoryless strategies and both
variants thus coincide as mentioned earlier.
Solving average-energy games. Finally, consider the complexity of deciding the winner in a two-player
AE game. By Thm. 8, one can guess an optimal memoryless strategy for P2 and solve the remaining one-
player game for P1, in polynomial time (by Thm. 7). The converse is also true: one can guess the strategy
of P1 and solve the remaining game where S1 = ∅ in polynomial time. Thus, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 9. The AE problem for two-player games is in NP ∩ coNP.
We complete our study by proving that MP games can be encoded into AE ones in polynomial time.
The former are known to be in NP ∩ coNP but whether they belong to P is a long-standing open question
(e.g., [38,26,9,13]). Hence, w.r.t. current knowledge, the NP ∩ coNP-membership of the AE problem can be
considered optimal. The key of the construction is to double each edge of the original game and modify the
weight function such that each pair of successive edges corresponding to such a doubled edge now has a total
energy level of zero, and an average-energy that is exactly equal to the weight of the original edge. Then we
apply decomposition techniques as in Lem. 5 to establish the equivalence.
Theorem 10. Mean-payoff games can be reduced to average-energy games in polynomial time.
Proof. Let G = (S1, S2, E, w) be a game, and t ∈ Q be the threshold for the mean-payoff problem. From G,
we build another game G′ = (S′1, S
′
2, E
′, w′) such that
– S′1 = S1 ∪E and S
′
2 = S2;
– E′ contains two types of edges:
• (s, e) ∈ E′ iff there exists s′ such that e = (s, s′) ∈ E. Then w′(s, e) = 2 · w(e).
• (e, s′) ∈ E′ for any e = (s, s′) ∈ E. Then w′(e, s′) = −2 · w(e).
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We claim that P1 has a strategy ensuring objective MeanPayoff (t) in G if and only if the answer for the AE
problem in G′ is Yes for the same threshold t. A similar construction is used in [5].
With a prefix ρ = (si)i≤n in G, we can associate a prefix ρ
′ = (s′i)i≤2n in G
′ as follows: for all k ≤ n,
s′2k = sk, and for all k < n, s
′
2k+1 = (sk, sk+1). The mean-payoff along ρ then equals the average energy
along ρ′ (assuming initial energy 0 for ρ′). Indeed, applying the same decomposition arguments as for Lem. 5
and by definition of the weight function w′, we have that
AE (ρ′) =
1
n
n−1∑
i=0
2 · w′(si, (si, si+1)) + w′((si, si+1), si+1)
2
=
1
n
n−1∑
i=0
4 · w(si, si+1)− 2 · w(si, si+1)
2
=
1
n
n−1∑
i=0
w(si, si+1) = MP(ρ).
Conversely, with a prefix ρ′ = (s′i)i≤2n in G
′ starting and ending in a state in S1 ∪ S2, we can associate a
prefix ρ = (si)i≤n in G such that sk = s
′
2k for all k ≤ n. Again, assuming the initial energy is zero in ρ
′, the
average energy along ρ′ equals the mean payoff along ρ.
Now, assume that P1 has a winning strategy σ in G from some state s ∈ S1 ∪ S2, achieving mean-payoff
less than or equal to t. Consider the strategy σ′ for G′ defined as σ′(ρ′) = σ(ρ) if ρ′ ends in S1. If ρ
′ ends in
a T -state of the form (s, s′), then we let σ′(ρ′) = s′, which is the only possible outgoing edge. We see that
the outcomes of σ′ correspond to the outcomes of σ, so that, assuming that the initial energy level is zero,
σ′ enforces that the average-energy is below t for any infinite outcome. Conversely, given a strategy σ′ for
G′ whose outcomes have average-energy below t, the strategy defined by σ(ρ) = σ′(ρ′) for all finite paths ρ
in G secures a mean-payoff below t. Observe that the equivalence holds both between AE and MP , and
between AE and MP . Indeed, we have seen that for both MP and AE games, memoryless strategies suffice
and decision problems for both variants coincide. ⊓⊔
4 Average-Energy with Lower- and Upper-Bounded Energy
We extend the AE framework with constraints on the running energy level of the system. Such constraints
are natural in many applications where the energy capacity is bounded (e.g., fuel tank, battery charge).
We first study the case where the energy is subject to both a lower bound (here, zero) and an upper bound
(U ∈ N). We study the problem for the fixed initial energy level cinit := 0. In this case, the range of acceptable
energy levels is by definition constrained to the interval [0, U ]. Our approach benefits from this: we solve the
AELU problem by considering an AE problem (and subsequently, an MP problem) over an expanded game
that explicitly accounts for the lower and upper bounds on the energy.
Formally, we want to decide if P1 can ensure a sufficiently low AE while keeping the EL within the
allowed range.
Problem 2 (AELU ) Given a game G, an initial state sinit, an upper bound U ∈ N, and a threshold t ∈ Q,
decide if P1 has a winning strategy σ1 ∈ Σ1 for the objective EnergyLU (U, cinit := 0) ∩ AvgEnergy(t).
Again, we present results for the supremum variant AE but they also hold for the infimum one AE .
Illustration. Consider the one-player game in Fig. 3. The energy constraints force P1 to keep the energy
in [0, 3] at all times. Hence, only three strategies can be followed safely, respectively inducing plays π1, π2
and π3. Due to the bounds on energy, it is natural that strategies need to alternate between both a positive
and a negative cycle to satisfy objective EnergyLU (U, cinit := 0) (since no simple zero cycle exists). It is yet
interesting that to play optimally (play π3), P1 actually has to use both positive cycles, and in the appropriate
order (compare plays π2 and π3).
This type of alternating behavior is more intricate than for other classical conjunctions of objectives.
Consider for example energy parity [12] or multi-dimensional energy games [15,37]. It is usually necessary
to use different cycles in such games: intuitively, one needs one “good” cycle for each dimension and one for
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(a) One-player AELU
game.
Step
Energy
0
1
2
3
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
AE = 3/2
(b) Play pi1 = (acacacab)
ω.
Step
Energy
0
1
2
3
1 2 3 4 5
AE = 8/5
(c) Play pi2 = (aacab)
ω.
Step
Energy
0
1
2
3
1 2 3 4 5
AE = 1
(d) Play pi3 = (acaab)
ω.
Fig. 3: Example of a one-player AELU game (U = 3) and the evolution of energy under different strategies
that maintain it within [0, 3] at all times. The minimal average-energy is obtained with play π3: alternating
in order between the +1, +2 and −3 cycles.
the parity objective, and a winning strategy needs to alternate between those cycles. However, there is no
need to use two different cycles that are “good” w.r.t. the same part of the objective. In the case of AELU
games, we see that it is sometimes necessary to use two (or more) different cycles even though they impact
the sum of weights in the same direction (e.g., several positive cycles). This gives a hint of the complexity
of AELU games.
4.1 Pseudo-polynomial algorithm and complexity bounds
We first reduce the AELU problem to the AE problem over a pseudo-polynomial expanded game, i.e., poly-
nomial in the size of the original AELU game and in U ∈ N. By Thm. 9 and Thm. 7, this reduction induces
NEXPTIME ∩ coNEXPTIME-membership of the two-player AELU problem, and EXPTIME-membership of
the one-player one. We improve the complexity for two-player games by further reducing the AE game to an
MP game: this yields EXPTIME-membership, which is optimal (Thm. 13). We also improve the one-player
case by observing that a witness lasso path in the MP game can be built on-the-fly, and the mean-payoff
of this path can be computed using only polynomial space in the original game, hence we end up with
PSPACE-membership which we also prove optimal in Thm. 13.
Observe that if U is encoded in unary or if U is polynomial in the size of the original game, the complexity
of the AELU problem collapses to NP∩ coNP for two-player games and to P for one-player games thanks to
our reduction to an AE problem and the results of Thm. 9 and Thm. 7.
The reductions. Given a game G = (S1, S2, E, w), an initial state sinit, an upper bound U ∈ N, and
a threshold t ∈ Q, we reduce the AELU problem to an AE problem as follows. If at any point along
a play, the energy drops below zero or exceeds U , the play will be losing for the EnergyLU (U, cinit := 0)
objective, hence also for its conjunction with the AE one. So we build a new game G′ over the state space
(S × {0, 1, . . . , U}) ∪ {sink}. The idea is to include the energy level within the state labels, with sink as an
absorbing state reached only when the energy constraint is breached. We now consider the AE problem for
threshold t on G′. By putting a self-loop of weight 1 on sink, we ensure that if the energy constraint is not
guaranteed in G, the answer to the AE problem in G′ will be No as the average-energy will be infinite due
to reaching this positive loop and repeating it forever. Hence, we show that the AELU objective can be won
in G if and only if the AE one can be won in G′ (thus avoiding the sink state). The result of the reduction
for the game in Fig. 3a is presented in Fig. 4.
Lemma 11. The AELU problem over a game G = (S1, S2, E, w), with an initial state sinit, an upper bound
U ∈ N, and a threshold t ∈ Q, is reducible to an AE problem for the same threshold t ∈ Q over a game
G′ = (S′1, S
′
2, E
′, w′) such that |S′| = (U + 1) · |S| + 1 and W ′ = max {min {W, U}, 1}, i.e., the largest
absolute weight in G′ is at most the same as in G, or equal to constant 1.
Proof. Consider the game G = (S1, S2, E, w), with initial state sinit, upper bound U ∈ N and threshold t ∈ Q.
We define the expanded game G′ = (S′1, S
′
2, E
′, w′) as follows.
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(a, 0) (a, 1) (a, 2) (a, 3)
(b, 0) (b, 1) (b, 2) (b, 3)
(c, 0) (c, 1) (c, 2) (c, 3)
sink
1 | 0 1 | 1 1 | 2
0 | 0 0 | 1 0 | 2 0 | 3
1 | 0 1 | 1 1 | 2 1 | 3
1 | 2
0 | 0 0 | 1 0 | 2 0 | 3
−3 | 3
2 | 0 2 | 1
Fig. 4: Reduction from the AELU game in Fig. 3a to an AE game and further reduction to an MP game
over the same expanded graph. For the sake of succinctness, the weights are written as c | c′ with c the
weight used in the AE game and c′ the one used in the MP game. We use the upper bound U = 3 and
the average-energy threshold t = 1 (the optimal value in this case). The optimal play π3 = (acaab)
ω of the
original game corresponds to an optimal memoryless play in the expanded graph.
– S′1 = (S1 × {0, 1, . . . , U}) ∪ {sink}.
– S′2 = S2 × {0, 1, . . . , U}.
– For all (u, v) ∈ E, (u, c) ∈ S′, we have that:
1. if d = c+ w(u, v) ∈ [0, U ], then e =
(
(u, c), (v, d)
)
∈ E′ and w′(e) = w(u, v),
2. else e =
(
(u, c), sink
)
∈ E′ and w′(e) = 1.
– (sink, sink) ∈ E′ and w(sink, sink) = 1.
The game G′ starts in state (sinit, 0) and edges are built naturally to reflect the changes in the energy level.
Whenever the energy drops below zero or exceeds U , we redirect the edge to sink, where a self-loop of weight
1 is repeated forever.
We claim that P1 has a winning strategy σ1 for the AELU objective in G if and only if he has a winning
strategy σ′1 for the AE objective in G
′, for the very same average-energy threshold t.
First, consider the left-to-right implication. Assume σ1 is winning for objective EnergyLU (U, cinit := 0)∩
AvgEnergy(t) in G. The very same strategy can be followed in G′, ignoring the additional information on the
energy in the state labels. Precisely, for any prefix ρ′ = (s0, c0)(s1, c1) . . . (sn, cn) in G
′, we define σ′1(ρ
′) =
(s, c) where s = σ1(ρ) for ρ = s0s1 . . . sn and c = cn +w(sn, s). Obviously, playing this strategy ensures that
the special state sink is never reached, as otherwise it would not be winning for EnergyLU (U, cinit := 0) in G,
by construction of G′. Since all weights are identical in both games except on edges entering the sink state,
we have that any consistent outcome π′ of σ′1 in G
′ corresponds to a consistent outcome π of σ1 in G such
that AE (π′) = AE (π), and conversely. Therefore, σ′ is clearly winning for objective AvgEnergy(t) in G′.
Second, consider the right-to-left implication. Assume σ′1 is winning for AvgEnergy(t) in G
′. Then this
strategy ensures that sink is avoided forever. Otherwise, there would exist a consistent outcome π′ reaching
sink, and such that AE (π′) = ∞ > t because of the strictly positive self-loop. Thus the strategy would not
be winning. Hence by construction of G′, this strategy trivially ensures EnergyLU (U, cinit := 0) in G
′. From
σ′1, we build a strategy σ1 in G in the natural way, potentially integrating the information on the energy
within the memory of σ1. Again, there is a bijection between plays avoiding sink in G
′ and plays in G, such
that σ1 is winning for EnergyLU (U, cinit := 0) ∩AvgEnergy(t) in G.
Hence we have shown the claimed reduction. For the sake of completeness, observe that the reduction
holds both for AE and AE variants of the average-energy. It remains to discuss the size of the expanded
game. Observe that |S′| = (U + 1) · |S| + 1. Furthermore, if W is the largest absolute weight in G, then
W ′ = max {min {W,U}, 1} is the largest one in G′. Indeed, W ′ is upper-bounded by U by construction (as
all edges of absolute weight larger than U can be redirected directly to sink) and it is lower-bounded by 1
due to edges leading to sink. So the state space of G′ is polynomial in the state space of G and in the value
of the upper bound U , while its weights are bounded by either the largest weight W , the upper bound U or
constant 1. ⊓⊔
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We now show that the AE game G′ can be further reduced to an MP game G′′ by modifying the weight
structure of the graph. Essentially, all edges leaving a state (s, c) of G′ are given weight c in G′′, i.e., the
current energy level, and the self-loop on sink is given weight (⌈t⌉ + 1). This modification is depicted in
Fig. 4. We claim that the AE problem for threshold t ∈ Q in G′ is equivalent to the MP problem for the
same threshold in G′′. Indeed, we show that with our change of weight function, reaching sink implies losing,
both in G′ for AE and in G′′ for MP , and all plays that do not reach sink have the same value for their
average-energy in G′ as for their mean-payoff in G′′.
Lemma 12. The AE problem over the game G′ = (S′1, S
′
2, E
′, w′) defined in Lem. 11 is reducible to an MP
problem for the same threshold t ∈ Q over a game G′′ = (S′1, S
′
2, E
′, w′′) sharing the same state space but
with largest absolute weight W ′′ = max{U, ⌈t⌉+1}, where U is the energy upper bound of the original AELU
problem.
Proof. Let G′ = (S′1, S
′
2, E
′, w′) be the game defined in Lem. 11, as a reduction from the original game G for
the AELU problem with upper bound U ∈ N and average-energy threshold t ∈ Q. We now build the game
G′′ = (S′1, S
′
2, E
′, w′′) by simply modifying the weight function of G′. The changes are as follows:
– For all edge e = ((s, c), (s′, c′)) ∈ E′, its weight in G′ is w′(e) = c′ − c and we now set it to w′′(e) = c
in G′′. Recall that by construction of G′, the value c represents the current energy level for any prefix
ending in (s, c). This is the value we now use for the outgoing edge. Also, this value is constrained in
[0, U ] by definition of G′.
– For all edge e = ((s, c), sink) ∈ E′, its weight in G′ is w′(e) = 1 and we now set it to w′′(e) = c in G′′ for
the sake of consistency (the actual value over this type of edges will not matter eventually).
– For the self-loop e = (sink, sink) ∈ E′, its weight in G′ is w′(e) = 1 and we now set it to w′′(e) = ⌈t⌉+ 1
in G′′. That is, reaching sink will imply a mean-payoff higher than the threshold.
Before proving the claim, we show that for all plays π ∈ Plays(G′) = Plays(G′′) that do not reach
sink, we have that AEG′(π) = MPG′′(π), where the subscript naturally refers to the change of weight
function. Let π = s′0s
′
1s
′
2 . . . = (s0, c0)(s1, c1)(s2, c2) . . . be such a play, where for all i ≥ 0, s
′
i ∈ S
′ and
(si, ci) ∈ S × [0, U ] ∩N is its corresponding label. By definition of G′′, we have that,
∀n ≥ 0, w′′(s′n, s
′
n+1) = cn = ELG′(π(n)).
Hence by definition of the mean-payoff and the average-energy,
MPG′′(π) = lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
i=0
w′′(s′i, s
′
i+1) = lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
i=0
ELG′(π(i)) = AEG′(π). (4)
For the sake of completeness, observe that this equality does not hold for plays reaching sink, as they have
infinite average-energy in G′ but finite mean-payoff in G′′.
We proceed by proving the claim that P1 has a winning strategy σ′1 for the AE objective in G
′ if and
only if he has a winning strategy σ′′1 for the MP objective in G
′′, for the very same threshold t.
First, consider the left-to-right implication. Assume σ′1 is winning for AvgEnergy(t) in G
′. We apply the
same strategy in G′′ straightforwardly as the underlying graph is not modified. Since this strategy is winning
for the AE objective in G′, it necessarily avoids sink both in G′ and G′′ (as otherwise the AE would be
infinite). Hence by Eq. (4), we have that σ′1 is also winning for MeanPayoff (t) in G
′′.
Second, consider the right-to-left implication. Assume σ′′1 is winning for MeanPayoff (t) in G
′′. Since
the self-loop on sink has weight ⌈t⌉ + 1, it is necessary that σ′′1 never reaches sink otherwise it would not
be winning. Hence we apply the same strategy in G′ and by Eq. (4), we have that σ′′1 is also winning for
AvgEnergy(t) in G′.
This proves correctness of the reduction. The same reasoning can be followed for AE (thus using MP)
instead of AE . We end by discussing the size of G′′. Clearly, the state space S′′ is identical to S′, hence
|S′′| = (U + 1) · |S|+ 1. However, the largest absolute weight in G′′ is W ′′ = max{U, ⌈t⌉ + 1}. Indeed, the
self-loop on sink has weight (⌈t⌉+1) and all other edges have weight bounded by the energy upper bound U
by construction. ⊓⊔
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Illustration. Consider the AELU game G depicted in Fig. 3a. We have seen that the optimal strategy is
π3 = (acaab)
ω. Now consider the reduction to the AE game, and further to the MP game, depicted in Fig. 4.
The optimal (memoryless) strategy in both the AE game G′ and the MP game G′′ is to create the play
π′ = ((a, 0)(c, 1)(a, 1)(a, 3)(b, 0))ω, which corresponds to the optimal play π3 in the original game. It can be
checked that AEG(π3) = AEG′(π
′) = MPG′′(π
′).
Complexity. The reduction from the AELU game to the AE one induces a pseudo-polynomial blow-up in
the number of states. Thanks to the second reduction and the use of a pseudo-polynomial algorithm for the
MP game [38,9], we get EXPTIME-membership, which is optimal for two-player games thanks to the lower
bound proved for EGLU [6]. The complexity is reduced when the bound U is given in unary or is polynomial
in the size of the game, matching the one obtained for AE games without energy constraints.
For the one-player case, we also use the reduction to anMP game. By [17], optimal memoryless strategies
exist, hence it suffices to non-deterministically build a simple lasso path in G′′, and to check that it satisfies
the mean-payoff constraint. It can be done using only polynomial space through on-the-fly computation.
Theorem 13. The AELU problem is EXPTIME-complete for two-player games and PSPACE-complete for
one-player games. If the upper bound U ∈ N is polynomial in the size of the game or encoded in unary, the
AELU problem collapses to NP ∩ coNP and P for two-player and one-player games, respectively.
Proof. Let G = (S1, S2, E, w) be the original AELU game, W ∈ N its largest absolute weight, U ∈ N
the upper bound for energy and t ∈ Q the threshold for the AELU problem. By Lem. 11, this AELU
problem is reducible to an AE problem for the same threshold t over a game G′ = (S′1, S
′
2, E
′, w′) such that
|S′| = (U + 1) · |S| + 1 and W ′ = max {min {W, U}, 1}. By Lem. 12, the AELU problem can be further
reduced to anMP problem for the same threshold t over a game G′′ = (S′1, S
′
2, E
′, w′′) sharing the same state
space as G′ but with largest absolute weight W ′′ = max{U, ⌈t⌉ + 1}. We start by proving the complexity
upper bounds.
First, consider the one-player case. Combining Thm. 7 and the reduction to an AE game, we obtain that
one-player AELU games can be solved in pseudo-polynomial time, i.e., polynomial in |S| but also in the
value of U (hence exponential in the size of its binary encoding). This both gives EXPTIME-membership of
one-player AELU games with arbitrary upper bounds, and P-membership of the same games with polynomial
or unary upper bounds. For arbitrary bounds, we improve the complexity from EXPTIME to PSPACE. To
do so, we consider the further reduction to an MP game, but we do not completely build the MP game G′′
which is known to be of exponential size. Instead, we build non-deterministically a witness lasso path (thanks
to memoryless determinacy [17], they are sufficient) and check on-the-fly that the path is winning or not,
using only polynomial space. Recall that we consider a game G′′ such that S′2 = ∅. Our non-deterministic
algorithm answers Yes if P1 has a winning strategy in G′′ (and hence in G thanks to Lem. 11 and Lem. 12),
No otherwise, and is as follows:
1. Guess a state s′r ∈ S
′
1 = (S1 × {0, 1, . . . , U}) ∪ {sink} that will be the starting (and ending) state of the
cycling part of the lasso path. For the following, we assume that s′r 6= sink otherwise the lasso path that
we are trying to build is clearly losing (see proof of Lem. 12) and the algorithm answers No. Thus, store
state s′r = (sr,m) for some m ∈ {0, . . . , U}.
2. Check that s′r is reachable from the initial state (sinit, 0). This can be done in NLOGSPACE w.r.t. the size
of G′′ (see e.g., [35]), hence NPSPACE w.r.t. the original problem. If it is not, then the answer is No.
3. Build step by step5 a lasso path by constructing a simple cycle in G′′ starting in s′r. This construction is
non-deterministic: if at any point, the sink state is reached, the algorithm returns No. The construction
stops as soon as s′r is reached, or after |S
′| + 1 steps if s′r is not reached: in the latter case, the answer
is also No (after |S′| + 1 steps, we know for certain that a cycle was created hence our lasso path is
complete). While constructing the cycle, we make on-the-fly computations: at each step, the next state
is chosen non-deterministically and the only information that is stored — except from state s′r used to
determine the end of the cycle — is the number of steps from leaving s′r, and the sum of the weights
seen along the cycle.
5 Observe that given a state in G′′, it is indeed possible to build any neighboring state using only E and w from the
original game: one can effectively build the graph G′′ on-the-fly.
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4. Assume s′r is reached (otherwise we have seen that the answer is No). Let s
′
0s
′
1 . . . s
′
l be the sequence
of states visited along the construction, with s′0 = s
′
l = s
′
r. We have stored the length l and the sum
of weights γ =
∑l−1
i=0 w
′′(s′i, s
′
i+1). Now, we check if
γ
l
≤ t: this quantity is the mean-payoff of the lasso
path we have constructed. If yes, then the answer is Yes, thanks to Lem. 11 and Lem. 12: the lasso path
describes a winning strategy. Otherwise, the answer is No as this lasso path represents a losing strategy,
by the same lemmas.
The correctness of this algorithm is guaranteed by Lem. 11 and Lem. 12. It remains to argue that it only
uses polynomial space in the original AELU problem. Observe that our on-the-fly computations only need to
record the state s′r, the current state, the current length and the current sum. We have that both states belong
to S1×{0, 1, . . . , U}, that l < |S
′| = (U+1)·|S|+1 and that the sum is bounded by l·W ′′ = l·max{U, ⌈t⌉+1}.
Hence, encoding those values only requires a polynomial number of bits w.r.t. the input of the AELU problem
(i.e., logarithmic in the upper bound U , the largest weight W and the threshold t). This proves that our
algorithm lies in NPSPACE, and by Savitch’s theorem [35] we know that NPSPACE = PSPACE: hence we
proved the upper bound for the one-player AELU problem.
Second, consider two-player AELU games. In this case, we solve the MP problem over G
′′ using a pseudo-
polynomial algorithm such as the one presented in [9], whose complexity is O(|S∗|3 ·W ∗) for a game with
|S∗| states and largest absolute weight W ∗ ∈ N. Therefore, the complexity of solving the original AELU
problem is
O
(
|S′|3 ·W ′′
)
= O
((
(U + 1) · |S|+ 1
)3
·max{U, ⌈t⌉+ 1}
)
,
which is clearly pseudo-polynomial. Hence we obtain EXPTIME-membership for two-player AELU games. If
the upper bound U ∈ N is polynomial in the size of the game or encoded in unary, it is sufficient to solve
the polynomially-larger AE game G′ using Thm. 9 to obtain NP ∩ coNP-membership.
Now consider lower bounds. The AELU problem trivially encompasses the lower- and upper-bounded
energy problem EGLU , i.e., the AELU without consideration of the average-energy. Indeed, consider a gameG
with an objective EnergyLU (U, cinit := 0), for some U ∈ N. Assume P1 has a winning strategy for this
objective. Then this strategy ensures that along any consistent outcome π, the running energy at any point
is at most equal to U . By definition, this implies that AE (π) ≤ AE (π) ≤ U . Hence this strategy is also
winning for the AELU objective written as the conjunction EnergyLU (U, cinit := 0) ∩ AvgEnergy(t := U).
The converse is also trivially true. Ergo, any lower bound on the complexity of the EGLU problem also
holds for the AELU one. The EXPTIME-hardness of the two-player EGLU problem was proved in [6], the
PSPACE-hardness of the one-player version was proved in [18] (in the equivalent setting of reachability in
bounded one-counter automata). Note that those results clearly rely on having an upper bound U larger
than polynomial (w.r.t. the size of the game) and encoded in binary, as we have already shown that in the
opposite case the complexity of the problem is reduced.
Finally, observe that the same reduction and complexities also hold if we use AE instead of AE to define
the AELU problem. This concludes our proof. ⊓⊔
Remark 14. One could argue that the reduction from AE games to MP games presented in Lem. 12 could
be used to solve AE games without resorting to the specific analysis presented in Sect. 3. Indeed, in the case
where the mean-payoff value is zero, any memoryless strategy (which we know to suffice) that is winning
should only create zero cycles: the energy can be constrained in the range [−2 · |S| ·W, 2 · |S| ·W ] along
any winning play. However, applying a pseudo-polynomial MP algorithm on this new game would only
grant EXPTIME-membership for AE games (because of the polynomial dependency on W ), in contrast to
the NP ∩ coNP and P results obtained with the refined analysis for two-player and one-player AE games
respectively.
4.2 Memory requirements
We prove pseudo-polynomial lower and upper bounds on memory for the two players in AELU games. The
upper bound follows from the reduction to a pseudo-polynomial AE game and the memoryless determinacy
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of AE games proved in Thm. 8. Observe that winning strategies obtained via our reductions have a natural
form: they are memoryless w.r.t. configurations (s, c) denoting the current state and the current energy level.
As noted before, when the upper bound on energy U ∈ N is polynomial or given in unary, the expanded
game is only polynomial in size, and the memory needs are also reduced.
The lower bound can be witnessed in two families of games asking for strategies using memory polynomial
in the energy upper bound U ∈ N to be won by P1 (Fig. 5a) or P2 (Fig. 5b) respectively. It is interesting
to observe that those families already ask for such memory when considering the simpler EGLU objective
(i.e., bounded energy only). Sufficiency of pseudo-polynomial memory for EGLU games follows from [6] but
to the best of our knowledge, it was not proved in the literature that such memory is also necessary.
s s′−U
1
0
(a) P1 needs to take U times (s, s
′) before
taking (s, s) once and repeating.
s a
b c d e f
g
1
−1 1 0 0 0
0 0 −U 0 1
(b) P2 needs to increase the energy up to U using (a, c) to
force P1 to take (g, d) then make him lose by taking (a, b).
Fig. 5: Families of games witnessing the need for pseudo-polynomial-memory strategies for EGLU (and AELU )
objectives. The goal of P1 is to keep the energy in [0, U ] at all times, for U ∈ N. The left game is won by P1
and the right one by P2 but both require memory polynomial in the value U to be won.
Theorem 15. Pseudo-polynomial-memory strategies are both sufficient and necessary to win in EGLU and
AELU games with arbitrary energy upper bound U ∈ N, for both players. Polynomial memory suffices when U
is polynomial in the size of the game or encoded in unary.
Proof. We first prove the upper bound on memory. The expanded game G′ built in the reduction from the
AELU to the AE problem (Lem. 11) has a state space of size |S′| = (U +1) · |S|+1, over which memoryless
strategies suffice, by Thm. 8. Thus, winning for the AELU objective only requires memory that is polynomial
in the original number of states and the upper bound value U ∈ N. The same reduction holds for EGLU
games with an even simpler safety objective (never reaching sink) instead of the AE one (or equivalently
with the AE objective for threshold t = U). Thus, with regard to the binary encoding of U , strategies require
exponential memory in general. For the special cases of unary encoding or polynomially bounded value U ,
polynomial memory suffices. Note that as usual, these arguments are true for both the AE and the AE
versions of the objective.
We now discuss the two families of games witnessing that pseudo-polynomial memory is also a lower
bound for both players.
First, consider the one-player game depicted in Fig. 5a and parametrized by the value U ∈ N. Assume
the objective is EGLU , asking for the energy to remain within [0, U ] at all times. Recall that the initial
energy level is fixed to cinit := 0. It is easy to see that there is only one acceptable strategy for P1: playing
(s, s′) exactly U times, then playing the self-loop (s, s) once, and repeating this forever. Indeed, any other
strategy eventually leads the energy outside the allowed range. Hence, to win this game, P1 needs a strategy
described by a Moore machine whose memory contains at least (U + 1) states. This proves that pseudo-
polynomial memory is required for P1 in EGLU games. Furthermore, the same argument can be applied on
this game with objective AELU by considering the average-energy threshold t := U which is trivially ensured
by strategies satisfying the EGLU objective.
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Second, consider the two-player6 EGLU game depicted in Fig. 5b. Again this game is parametrized by
the energy upper bound U ∈ N and the initial energy level is fixed to cinit := 0. This game can be won by P2
using the following strategy: if the energy level is in [1, U ], play (a, c), otherwise play (a, b). Note that this
strategy again requires at least (U + 1) states of memory in its Moore machine (to keep track of the energy
level).
This strategy is indeed winning. Observe that P1 can only decrease the energy by using edge (g, d) of
weight −U , and this edge can only be used safely if the energy level is exactly U . In addition, the energy is
bound to reach or exceed U eventually (as it will increase by 1 or 2 between each visit of a). If it exceeds
U , then P2 wins directly. Otherwise, assume that the energy is U when the game is in state g. If P1 plays
(g, f), he loses (the energy reaches U +1). If he plays (g, e), P2 wins by playing (a, c) (the energy also reaches
U + 1). And if P1 plays (g, d), P2 wins by playing (a, b) (the energy reaches −1). Hence, P2 wins the game
against all strategies of P1.
Now, observe that P2 cannot win if he uses a strategy with less memory states in its Moore machine.
Indeed, any such strategy cannot keep track of all the energy levels between 0 and U and play (a, c) a
sufficient number of times in a row before switching to the appropriate choice (depending on the energy
being 0 or U). Therefore, if P2 uses such a strategy, P1 can maintain the energy in the allowed range by
simply reacting to edge (a, b) with (g, f) and to edge (a, c) by choosing between (g, d) (if the energy is U)
and (g, e) (otherwise). Such choices are safe for P1 as the strategy of P2 does not have enough memory to
distinguish the resulting energy levels from the intermediate ones.
This proves that P2 also needs pseudo-polynomial memory in EGLU games. Finally, we remark that this
reasoning also holds for the AELU objective with threshold t := U , as for the previous game. ⊓⊔
5 Average-Energy with Lower-Bounded Energy
We conclude with the conjunction of an AE objective with a lower bound (again equal to zero) constraint
on the running energy, but no upper bound. This corresponds to an hypothetical unbounded energy storage.
Hence, its applicability is limited, but it may prove interesting on the theoretical standpoint.
Problem 3 (AEL) Given a game G, an initial state sinit and a threshold t ∈ Q, decide if P1 has a winning
strategy σ1 ∈ Σ1 for objective EnergyL(cinit := 0) ∩ AvgEnergy(t).
This problem proves to be challenging to solve: we provide partial answers in the following, with a proper
algorithm for one-player games but only a correct but incomplete method for two-player games. As usual,
we present our results for the supremum variant AE .
Illustration. Consider the game in Fig. 3. Recall that for AELU with U = 3, the optimal play is π3,
and it requires alternation between all three different simple cycles. Now consider AEL. One may think that
relaxing the objective would allow for simpler winning strategies. This is not the case. Some new plays are now
acceptable w.r.t. the energy constraint, such as π4 = (aabaaba)
ω, with AE (π4) = 11/7 and π5 = (aaababa)
ω,
with AE (π5) = 18/7. Yet, the optimal play w.r.t. the AE (under the lower-bound energy constraint) is still
π3, hence still requires to use all the available cycles, in the appropriate order. This indicates that AEL
games also require complex solutions.
5.1 One-player games
We assume that the unique player is P1. Indeed, the opposite case is easy as for P2, the objective is a
disjunction and P2 can choose beforehand which sub-objective he will transgress, and do so with a simple
memoryless strategy (both AE and EGL games admit memoryless optimal strategies as seen before). We
show that one-player AEL problems lie in PSPACE by reduction to AELU problems for a well-chosen upper
bound U ∈ N and then application of Thm. 13.
6 In EGLU games with only P2 (i.e., S1 = ∅), P2 does not need memory to play as he can pick beforehand which of
the energy bounds (lower or upper) he will transgress, and then do so with a memoryless strategy.
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The reduction. Given a game G = (S1, S2 = ∅, E, w) with largest weight W ∈ N, an initial state sinit,
and a threshold t ∈ Q, we reduce the AEL problem to an AELU problem with an upper bound U ∈ N
defined as U := t+N2 +N3, with N =W · (|S|+2). Observe that the length of the binary encoding of U is
polynomial in the size of the game, the encoding of the largest weightW and the encoding of the threshold t.
The intuition is that if P1 can win a one-player AEL game, he can win it without ever reaching energy
levels higher than the chosen bound U , even if he is technically allowed to do so. Essentially, the interest of
increasing the energy is making more cycles available (as they become safe to take w.r.t. the lower bound
constraint), but increasing the energy further than necessary is not a good idea as it will negatively impact
the average-energy. To prove this reduction, we start from an arbitrary winning path in the AEL game, and
build a witness path that is still winning for the AEL objective, but also keeps the energy below U at all
times. Our construction exploits a result of Lafourcade et al. that bounds the value of the counter along a
path in a one-counter automaton (stated in [31] and proved in [30, Lem. 42]). We slightly adapt it to our
framework in the next lemma. The technique is identical, but the statement is more precise. In the following,
we call an expanded configuration of the game G a couple (s, c) where s ∈ S is a state and c ∈ Z a level of
energy.
Lemma 16. Let g ∈ Z. Let (s, c) and (s′, c′) be two expanded configurations of the game G such that there
exists an expanded path ρexp = (s0, c0) . . . (sm, cm) in G from (s, c) to (s
′, c′) with ci ≥ g for every 0 ≤ i ≤ m.
Then, there is a path ρ′exp = (s
′
0, c
′
0)(s
′
1, c
′
1) . . . (s
′
n, c
′
n) in G from (s, c) to (s
′, c′) such that:
– for every 0 ≤ i ≤ n, g ≤ c′i ≤ max{c, c
′, g} +N2 + N3, where N = W · (|S| + 2), with W the maximal
absolute weight in G;
– there is an (injective) increasing mapping ι : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . ,m} such that for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
s′i = sι(i) and c
′
i ≤ cι(i).
Furthermore, for any two expanded paths ρ1 and ρ2, with last(ρ1) = (s, c) and first(ρ2) = (s′, c′), if AE (ρ1·
ρexp · ρ2) ≤ g, then also AE (ρ1 · ρ′exp · ρ
2) ≤ AE (ρ1 · ρexp · ρ2) ≤ g.
Proof. We write α = W · (|S| + 1), β = (α +W ) · (α +W − 1) − 1 and K = max
{
c, c′, g
}
+ (α +W )2.
We apply inductively a transformation that removes similar ascending and descending segments of the path.
The segments are selected such that their composition is neutral w.r.t. the energy.
Pick a subpath ρexp[k, k + h] = (sk, ck) . . . (sk+h, ck+h) of ρexp, if it exists, such that:
(a) ck ≤ K and ck+h ≤ K;
(b) for every 0 < ℓ < h, ck+ℓ > K;
(c) there is 0 < ℓ < h such that ck+ℓ > K +W · (|S|+ 1) · β.
If such a subpath does not exist, then this means that the cost along ρexp is overall bounded by K +W ·
(|S|+1) ·β (since condition (a) is not restrictive— c, c′ ≤ K), which then concludes the proof. Hence, assume
such a subpath exists for the following steps.
Ascent part. Let k ≤ ℓ0 ≤ · · · ≤ ℓβ ≤ k + h be indices such that:
– cℓi > K + i ·W · (|S|+ 1);
– for every k ≤ ℓ < ℓi, cℓ ≤ K + i ·W · (|S|+ 1).
Fix 0 ≤ i ≤ β. Then it holds that cℓi ≤ K+i ·W ·(|S|+1)+W and thus cℓi+1−cℓi > K+(i+1)·W ·(|S|+1)−
(K+i ·W ·(|S|+1)+W ) =W ·(|S|+1)−W =W · |S|. Let Ji be a subset of [ℓi; ℓi+1] defined by ℓi ∈ Ji, and if
j ∈ Ji, then let j′ ≤ ℓi+1 be the smallest index larger than j (if it exists) such that cj′ > cj . Obviously we have
cj < cj′ ≤ cj +W . Hence the cardinal of Ji is at least 1+
W ·|S|
W
≥ |S|+1. Hence there is a state s˜(i) and two
indices ji,1 < ji,2 ∈ Ji with (sji,1 , cji,1) = (s˜
(i), α1) and (sji,2 , cji,2) = (s˜
(i), α2) with cℓi ≤ α1 < α2 ≤ cℓi+1 ,
hence using previous computed bounds, 0 < α2 − α1 ≤ cℓi+1 − cℓi < W · (|S| + 2) = α + W . We write
d˜(i) = α2 −α1. The segment between indices ji,1 and ji,2 is a candidate for being removed. Due to the value
of β, there is d ∈ {d˜(i) | 0 ≤ i ≤ β} that appears (α+W ) times in that set.
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Descent part. We do a similar reasoning for the “descent” part. There must exist indices k ≤ m0 ≤ · · · ≤
mβ ≤ k + h such that:
– cmi > K + (β − i) ·W · (|S|+ 1);
– for every mi < m ≤ k + h, cm ≤ K + (β − i) ·W · (|S|+ 1).
Note that we obviously have ℓβ < m0.
Then we apply the same combinatorics as for the ascent part. There is some value 0 < d′ < α+W which
appears at least α+W times in potential cycles within the segment ρexp[k, k + h].
Transformation. The algorithm then proceeds by removing d′ segments that increase the cost by d within
ρexp[ℓ0, ℓβ] and d segments that decrease the cost by d
′ within ρexp[m0,mβ ]. This yields another path ρ
′
exp
and an obvious injection of ρ′exp into ρexp which satisfies all the mentioned constraints. The sum of all energy
levels along ρ′exp is smaller than that along ρexp, and any energy level along ρ
′
exp is obtained from that along
ρexp by decreasing by at most 0 < d · d′ < (α+W )2. By assumption on segment ρexp[k, k+ h] and bound K,
we get that the cost along ρ′exp is always larger than or equal to g, c and c
′.
We iterate this transformation to get a uniform upper bound. We finally notice that the obtained upper
bound K +W · (|S| + 1) · β is bounded itself by max{c, c′, g} + N2 + N3, where N = W · (|S| + 2). This
implies the expected result. ⊓⊔
We build upon this lemma to define an appropriate transformation leading to the witness path and derive
a sufficiently large upper bound U ∈ N for the AELU problem.
Lemma 17. The AEL problem over a one-player game G = (S1, S2 = ∅, E, w), with an initial state sinit
and a threshold t ∈ Q, is reducible to an AELU problem over the same game G, for the same threshold t and
upper bound U := t+N2 +N3, with N =W · (|S|+ 2).
Proof. We prove that we can bound the energy along a witness of the one-player AEL problem. Let σ be
a winning strategy of P1 for the objective EnergyL(cinit := 0) ∩ AvgEnergy(t) and π = s0s1 . . . sn . . . be the
corresponding outcome.
We build another strategy σ˜ with corresponding play π˜ such that for every n, 0 ≤ cinit + EL(π˜(n)) ≤
cinit + t + N
2 + N3, where N = W · (|S| + 2) (W is the maximal absolute weight in G), and such that
AE (π˜) ≤ AE (π). We actually build the play π˜ directly, and infer strategy σ˜.
From π, we build the expanded play πexp = (s0, c0)(s1, c1) . . . (sn, cn) . . . such that ci = EL(π(i)) for every
i ≥ 0. Since π is a witness satisfying the objective EnergyL(cinit)∩AvgEnergy(t), it holds that ci+cinit ≥ 0 for
every i ≥ 0. We now show that some pair (s, c) is visited infinitely often along πexp. Toward a contradiction,
assume that it is not the case. Then since energy levels are bounded from below along π, this means that
lim infn→∞ cn = TP (π) = +∞, and by Lem. 2, that AE (π) = +∞ which contradicts the play being winning
for the AE objective with threshold t ∈ Q. Now select the smallest energy c and state s such that (s, c) is
visited infinitely often along πexp. Pick n0 such that (1) (sn0 , cn0) = (s, c), (2) π[≥ n0] = sn0sn0+1 . . . only
visits states that are visited infinitely often along π, and (3) for every (s′, c′) along πexp[≥ n0], it holds that
c′ ≥ c.
We can then write πexp as πexp[≤ n0] · C1 · C2 . . . where each Ci ends at configuration (s, c) (hence Ci forms
a cycle), and each configuration (s′, c′) along some Ci satisfies c′ ≥ c. We write γi for the projection of Ci on
states (without energy level)— it forms a cycle as well. We obviously have AE (π) = EL(π(n0)) + AE (π[>
n0]) = c+AE(π[> n0]) by Lem. 4, and since AE (π) ≤ t, there must be some cycle Ci such that AE (γi) ≤ t−c.
We write γ for such a γi, and we define ̟ = π(n0) · γω: it is a lasso-shaped play which also satisfies the
objective EnergyL(cinit) ∩ AvgEnergy(t).
We will now modify the play ̟, so that the energy does not grow too much along it. We write ̟exp for
the expanded version of ̟: it is of the form ̟exp[≤ n0] ·
(
̟exp[n0 + 1, n0 + p]
)ω
, where ̟exp[n0 + 1, n0 + p]
projects onto γ when the energy information is removed (note that the last configurations of ̟exp[≤ n0] and
of ̟exp[n0 + 1, n0 + p] are (s, c)). We will do two things: (i) first we will work on the cycle γ; and (ii) then
we will work on the prefix ̟[≤ n0], to build a witness with a fixed upper bound on the energy. For the rest
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of the proof, we assume that ̟exp = (s0, c0)(s1, c1) . . . so that (sn, cn) = (s, c) for every n = n0 + b · p for
some integer b.
First consider point (i). Let us notice that c ≤ t, otherwise the average-energy along ̟ could not be at
most t (remember that the cost along the expanded version of γ starting at (s, c) is always larger than or equal
to c by construction). We pick the first maximal subpath ̟exp[k, k+h] of ̟exp with [k, k+h] ⊆ (n0, n0+p),
such that ck+ℓ > t for every 0 ≤ ℓ ≤ h. By maximality of ̟exp[k, k + h], it is the case that ck−1 ≤ t and
ck+h+1 ≤ t. We infer that t < ck ≤ t+W and t < ck+h ≤ t+W , where W is the maximal absolute weight
in the game G. We apply Lem. 16 to the path ̟exp[k, k + h] with g = t, and we get that we can build an
expanded path ̟
(k)
exp which is shorter than ̟exp[k, k + h] and such that:
– at all positions of ̟
(k)
exp, the energy is in the interval [t, t+N2 +N3], where N =W · (|S|+ 2);
– there is an injective increasing mapping ι : [0, |̟
(k)
exp|]→ [k, k+h] such that for every index 1 ≤ i ≤ |̟
(k)
exp|,
the state of ̟
(k)
exp[= i] coincides with that of ̟exp[= ι(i)] and the energy at position i of ̟
(k)
exp is smaller
than or equal to cι(i).
In particular, we have a new witness for the objective EnergyL(cinit) ∩ AvgEnergy(t), which is the play
̟[< n0] ·
(
̟[n0, k− 1] ·̟(k) ·̟[k+h+1, n0+ |γ|− 1]
)ω
, where ̟(k) is the projection of ̟
(k)
exp over the states
of the game G. We iterate this transformation over all relevant segments of γ (this will happen only a finite
number of times), and we end up with a new lasso-play ̟′ = ̟[≤ n0] · (γ′)ω such that:
– ̟′ satisfies the objective EnergyL(cinit) ∩ AvgEnergy(t);
– for every 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ |γ′|, −cinit ≤ EL(̟
′(n0 + ℓ)) ≤ t+N
2 +N3.
Now, consider point (ii). It remains to work on the prefix ̟[≤ n0] (which is still a prefix of ̟′). We
apply Lem. 16 to the prefix ̟[≤ n0] with g = 0, and we get an appropriately bounded witness.
Summing up, our construction proves that if there exists a winning play for EnergyL(cinit := 0) ∩
AvgEnergy(t) in the one-player game G, then there exists one for EnergyLU (U, cinit := 0) ∩ AvgEnergy(t),
with U := t+N2+N3. Since the converse implication is obvious (as the second objective is strictly stronger),
this concludes the proof of the reduction to an AELU game. ⊓⊔
Complexity. Plugging this bound U in the PSPACE algorithm for one-player AELU games (Thm. 13)
implies PSPACE-membership for one-player AEL games also. In terms of time complexity, we saw that this
problem can thus be solved in pseudo-polynomial time. We prove that no truly-polynomial-time algorithm
can be obtained unless P = NP as the one-player AEL problem is NP-hard. We show it by reduction from
the subset-sum problem [20]: given a finite set of naturals A = {a1, . . . , an} and a target natural v, decide if
there exists a subset B ⊆ A such that
∑
ai∈B
ai = v. The reduction is sketched in Fig. 6: a play corresponds
to a choice of subset. In order to keep a positive energy level, P1 has to pick a subset that achieves a sum
at least equal to v, but in order to satisfy the AE threshold, this sum must be at most v: hence P1 must be
able to pick a subset whose sum is exactly the target v.
s1
a1
¬a1
s2
a2
¬a2
sn
an
¬an
end 0
a1
0
0
0
a2
0
0
0
an
0
−v
−v
Fig. 6: Reduction from the subset-sum problem for target v ∈ N to a one-player AEL problem for average-
energy threshold t := v.
Theorem 18. The AEL problem is in PSPACE and at least NP-hard for one-player games.
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Proof. First, consider the claim of PSPACE-membership. Let G = (S1, S2 = ∅, E, w) be a game with initial
state sinit. Consider the AEL problem for a given average-energy threshold t ∈ Q. By Lem. 17, this problem
is reducible to the AELU problem with upper bound U := t + N
2 + N3, with N = W · (|S| + 2). Hence,
U is of order O(t +W 3 · |S|3), and its encoding is polynomial in the encoding of the original AEL problem
(including thresholds and weights, not only in the number of states of the original game!). Following the
complexity analysis presented in Thm. 13, we thus conclude that the one-player AEL problem is indeed in
PSPACE. In terms of time, by using the MP reduction and the pseudo-polynomial algorithm, we have an
algorithm for the one-player AEL problem that takes time of order
O
((
(U + 1) · |S|+ 1
)3
·max{U, ⌈t⌉+ 1}
)
= O
((
t+W 3 · |S|3
)4
· |S|3
)
,
which is still pseudo-polynomial in the size of the original AEL problem (i.e., polynomial in the number of
states and in the values of the largest absolute weight and of the average-energy threshold).
Second, we prove that the one-player AEL problem is NP-hard. Consider the subset-sum problem for the
set A = {a1, . . . , an} such that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ai ∈ N, and target v ∈ N. Deciding if there exists a
subset B ⊆ A such that
∑
ai∈B
ai = v is well-known to be NP-complete [20]. We reduce this problem to an
AEL problem over the game G depicted in Fig. 6. Observe that this game has polynomially as many states
as the size of A, and that its largest absolute weight is equal to the maximum between the largest element
of A and the target v. It is clear that there is a bijection between choices of subsets of A and plays in G. Let
us fix threshold t := v for the average-energy. Recall that Lem. 4 implies that the average-energy of any play
is exactly its energy level at the first visit of end (because afterwards the zero self-loop is repeated forever).
Hence, we have that
1. a play π in G is winning for EnergyL(cinit := 0) if and only if the corresponding subset B is such that∑
ai∈B
ai ≥ v;
2. a play π in G is winning for AvgEnergy(t := v) if and only if the corresponding subset B is such that∑
ai∈B
ai ≤ v.
Therefore, P1 has a winning strategy for the AEL objective EnergyL(cinit := 0) ∩ AvgEnergy(t := v) in G if
and only if there exists a subset B for which the sum of elements is exactly equal to the target v.
This proves the reduction from the subset-sum problem and the NP-hardness result. Observe two things.
First, the hardness proof relies on having set elements and a target value that are not polynomial in the size
of the input set A. Indeed, the subset-sum problem is solvable with a pseudo-polynomial algorithm, hence
in P for polynomial values. Second, our reduction also holds for the AE variant of the average-energy. ⊓⊔
Memory requirements. Recall that for P2, the situation is simpler and memoryless strategies suffice.
By the reduction to AELU , we know that pseudo-polynomial memory suffices for P1. This bound is tight as
witnessed by the family of games already presented in Fig. 5a. To ensure the lower bound on energy, P1 has
to play edge (s, s′) at least U times before taking the (s, s) self-loop. But to minimize the average-energy,
edge (s, s′) should never be played more than necessary. The optimal strategy is the same as for the AELU
problem: playing (s, s′) exactly U times, then (s, s) once, then repeating, forever. As shown in Thm. 15, this
strategy requires pseudo-polynomial memory.
Theorem 19. Pseudo-polynomial-memory strategies are both sufficient and necessary to win for P1 in one-
player AEL games. Memoryless strategies suffice for P2 in such games.
5.2 Two-player games
For the two-player AEL problem, we only provide partial answers, as open questions remain. We first discuss
decidability: we present an incremental algorithm that is correct but incomplete (Lem. 20) and we draw the
outline of a potential approach to obtain completeness hence decidability. Then, we prove that the two-player
AEL problem is at least EXPTIME-hard (Lem. 21). Finally, we show that, in contrast to the one-player case,
P2 also requires memory in two-player AEL games (Lem. 22).
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Decidability. Assume that there exists some U ∈ N such that P1 has a winning strategy for the AELU
problem with upper bound U and average-energy threshold t. Then, this strategy is trivially winning for the
AEL problem as well. This observation leads to an incremental algorithm that is correct (no false positives)
but incomplete (it is not guaranteed to stop).
Lemma 20. There is an algorithm that takes as input an AEL problem and iteratively solves corresponding
AELU problems for incremental values of U ∈ N. If a winning strategy is found for some U ∈ N, then it is
also winning for the original AEL problem. If no strategy is found up to value U ∈ N, then no strategy of P1
can simultaneously win the AEL problem and prevent the energy from exceeding U at all times.
While an incomplete algorithm clearly seems limiting from a theoretical standpoint, it is worth noting
that in practice, such approaches are common and often necessary restrictions, even for problems where a
complete algorithm is known to exist. For example, the existence of an initial energy level sufficient to win in
multi-dimensional energy games can be decided [15] but practical implementations resort to an incremental
scheme that is in practice incomplete because the theoretical bound granting completeness is too large to be
tackled efficiently by software synthesis tools [4]. In our case, we have already seen that if such a bound exists
for the two-player AEL problem, it needs to be at least exponential in the encoding of problem (cf. one-player
AEL games). Hence it seems likely that a prohibitive bound would be necessary, rendering the algorithm of
Lem. 20 more appealing in practice.
Nevertheless, we conjecture that the AEL problem is decidable for two-player games and that, similarly
to the one-player case, an upper bound on the energy can be obtained. Unfortunately, this claim is much
more challenging to prove for two-player games. Clearly, the approach of Lem. 17 has to be generalized: while
in one-player games we could pick a witness winning play and transform it, we now have to deal with tree
unfoldings—describing sets of plays—because of the uncontrollable choices made by P2.
A potentially promising approach is to define a notion close to the self-covering trees used in [15] for energy
games. Roughly, take any winning strategy of P1 in a two-player AEL game. Without further assumption,
this strategy could be infinite-memory. It can be represented by its corresponding infinite tree unfolding
where in nodes of P1, a unique child is given by the strategy, and in nodes of P2, all possible successors yield
different branches. Every rooted branch of this tree is infinite and describes a winning play. Then, we would
like to achieve the following steps.
1. Prove that all branches of this unfolding can be cut in such a way that the resulting finite tree describes
a finite-memory strategy that is still winning for the AEL objective.
2. Reduce the height of this finite tree by compressing parts of the branches: deleting embedded zero cycles
seems to be a good candidate for the transformation to apply.
3. Derive an upper bound on the height of the compressed tree and, consequently, on the maximal energy
level reached along any play consistent with the corresponding strategy.
4. Use this upper bound to reduce the AEL problem to an AELU problem.
Sadly, some challenges appear on the technical side when trying to implement this approach, mainly for
items 1 and 3. Intuitively, the additional difficulty (when compared to the approach developed in [15] and
similar works) arises from the fact that describing what is a good cycle pattern for the AEL objective is
much more intricate than it is for a simple EGL objective (in which case we simply look for zero cycles).
This makes the precise definition of an appropriate transformation of branches, and the resulting tree height
analysis, more tedious to achieve.
We also mention that the AEL problem could be reduced, following a construction similar to the one
given in Sect. 4.1, to a mean-payoff threshold problem over an infinite arena, where states of the expanded
graph are arranged respectively to their energy level, ranging from zero to infinity, and where weights would
also take values inside N ∪ {∞} (as they reflect the possible energy levels). To the best of our knowledge, it
is not known if mean-payoff games over such particular structures are decidable. If so, an algorithm would
have to fully exploit the peculiar form of those arenas, as it is for example known that general models such
as pushdown games are undecidable for the mean-payoff [16].
Finally, one could envision to fill the gap between one-player and two-playerAEL games by using a general
result similar to [23, Cor. 7]. Recall that we used it to derive memoryless determinacy in the two-player case
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from memoryless determinacy of both one-player versions (S1 = ∅ and S2 = ∅). However, we here have that
in one-player games, P1 requires pseudo-polynomial memory. Therefore, it is necessary to extend the result
of Gimbert and Zielonka to finite-memory strategies: that is, to show that if we have a bound on memory
valid in both one-player versions of a game, then this bound, or a derived one, is also valid in the two-player
version. This is not known to be the case in general, and establishing it for a sufficiently general class of
games seems challenging.
Complexity lower bound. We now prove that the two-player AEL problem would require at least expo-
nential time to solve. Our proof is by reduction from countdown games. A countdown game C is a weighted
graph (V , E), where V is the finite set of states, and E ⊆ V ×N \ {0}×V is the edge relation. Configurations
are of the form (v, c), v ∈ V , c ∈ N. The game starts in an initial configuration (vinit, c0) and transitions
from a configuration (s, c) are performed as follows. First, P1 chooses a duration d, 0 < d ≤ c such that
there exists e = (v, d, v′) ∈ E for some v′ ∈ V . Second, P2 chooses a state v′ ∈ V such that e = (v, d, v′) ∈ E .
Then the game advances to (v′, c − d). Terminal configurations are reached whenever no legitimate move
is available. If such a configuration is of the form (v, 0), P1 wins the play, otherwise P2 wins. Deciding the
winner given an initial configuration (vinit, c0) is EXPTIME-complete [27].
Our reduction is depicted in Fig. 7. The EL is initialized to c0, then it is decreasing along any play.
Consider the AEL objective for AE threshold t := 0. To ensure that the energy always stays non-negative,
P1 has to switch to stop while the EL is no less than zero. In addition, to ensure an AE no more than t = 0,
P1 has to obtain an EL at most equal to zero before switching to stop (as the AE will be equal to this EL
thanks to Lem. 4 and the zero self-loop on stop). Hence, P1 wins the AEL objective only if he can ensure a
total sum of chosen durations that is exactly equal to c0, i.e., if he can reach a winning terminal configuration
for the countdown game. The converse also holds.
start
vinit
(vinit,d1)
(vinit,d2)
(vinit,d3)
v′′
v′
v′′′
stop
c0
0
−d2
−d1
−d3
0
0
0
0 0
−d4
−d5
−d6
Fig. 7: Reduction from a countdown game C = (V , E) with initial configuration (vinit, c0) to a two-player AEL
problem for average-energy threshold t := 0.
Lemma 21. The AEL problem is EXPTIME-hard for two-player games.
Proof. Given a countdown game C = (V , E) and an initial configuration (vinit, c0), we build a game G =
(S1, S2, E, w) with initial state sinit such that P1 has a winning strategy in G for the AEL objective for
threshold t := 0 if and only if he has a winning strategy in C to reach a terminal configuration with counter
value zero. The construction is depicted in Fig. 7. Formally, the game G is built as follows.
– S1 = V ∪ {start, stop}.
– S2 = {(v, d) ∈ V ×N \ {0} | ∃ v′ ∈ V , (v, d, v′) ∈ E}.
– sinit = start.
– For each (v, d, v′) ∈ E , we have that (v, (v, d)) ∈ E with w(v, (v, d)) = −d and ((v, d), v′) ∈ E with
w((v, d), v′) = 0.
– Additionally, (start, vinit) ∈ E with w(start, vinit) = c0, (stop, stop) ∈ E with w(stop, stop) = 0 and for all
v ∈ V , (v, stop) ∈ E with w(v, stop) = 0.
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First, consider the left-to-right direction of the claim. Assume P1 has a winning strategy for the AEL
objective in G. As noted before, such a strategy necessarily reaches the energy level zero then switches to
stop directly. Hence, applying this strategy in the countdown game ensures that the sum of durations will
be exactly equal to c0 (recall that we start our AEL game by initializing the energy to c0 then decrease it at
every step by the duration chosen by P1). Thus, this strategy is winning in the countdown game C.
Second, consider the right-to-left direction. Assume that P1 has a winning strategy in the countdown
game C. Playing this strategy in G ensures to reach a state v ∈ S1 with energy level exactly equal to zero.
Thus a winning strategy for the AEL objective is to play the countdown strategy up to this point then to
immediately take the edge (v, stop). Indeed, any consistent outcome will satisfy the lower bound on energy
(as the energy will never go below zero), and it will have an average-energy equal to t = 0 (because the
energy level when reaching stop will be zero).
This shows both directions of the claim and concludes our proof. Observe that this reduction is also true
if we consider the AE variant of the average-energy. ⊓⊔
Memory requirements. We close our study of two-player AEL games by discussing the memory needs.
First note that we cannot provide upper bounds: if we had such bounds, we could derive a bound on the
energy along any consistent play and reduce the AEL problem to an AELU one as discussed before, hence
proving its decidability. Second, we already know by Thm. 19 that pseudo-polynomial memory is necessary
for P1. Finally, we present a simple game (Fig. 8) where P2 needs to use memory in order to prevent P1
from winning.
s1 s2 s3
0
−1
1 −1
2
Fig. 8: Simple two-player AEL game witnessing the need for memory even for P2.
Lemma 22. Pseudo-polynomial-memory strategies are necessary to win for P1 in two-player AEL games.
Memory is also required for P2 in such games.
Proof. We only have to prove that P2 needs memory in the game of Fig. 8. Consider the AEL objective for
the average-energy threshold t := 1 on this game. Assume that P2 is restricted to memoryless strategies.
Then, there are only two possible strategies for P2. If P2 always takes the self-loop (s2, s2), then the only
consistent play is s1(s2)
ω : it has AE equal to 1, and satisfies the lower bound constraint on energy, thus
P1 wins. If P2 always takes (s2, s3), then P1 can win by producing the following play: s1s2(s3s2s3)ω . It also
has AE equal to 1, and satisfies the energy constraint. Hence P2 cannot win this game with a memoryless
strategy. Nonetheless, he has a winning strategy that uses memory. Let this strategy be the one that plays
(s2, s3) once then chooses the self-loop (s2, s2) forever. When this strategy is used by P2, P1 has to pick
(s3, s2) in the first visit of s3 otherwise he loses because the energy goes below zero. But if P1 picks this edge,
the unique outcome becomes s1s2s3(s2)
ω , whose average-energy is 2 > t, hence also losing for P1. Thus, the
defined strategy is winning for P2. ⊓⊔
6 Conclusion
We presented a thorough study of the average-energy payoff. We showed that average-energy games belong to
the same intriguing complexity class as mean-payoff, total-payoff and energy games and that they are similarly
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memoryless determined. We then solved average-energy games with lower- and upper-bounded energy: such
a conjunction is motivated by previous case studies in the literature [10]. Lastly, we provided preliminary
results for the case of average-energy with a lower bound but no upper bound on the energy. Following the
publication of [7], Larsen et al. adressed a different problem in [32]: they proved that deciding if there exists
a threshold t ∈ Q such that P1 can win a two-player game for objective EnergyL(cinit := 0) ∩ AvgEnergy(t)
can be done in doubly-exponential time. This is indeed equivalent to deciding if there exists an upper-bound
U ∈ N such that P1 can win for the objective EnergyLU (U, cinit := 0), which is known to be in 2EXPTIME [25].
Unfortunately, this approach does not help in solving Problem 3, where the threshold t ∈ Q for the average-
energy is part of the input: solving two-player AEL games is still an open question.
We believe that the average-energy objective and its variations model relevant aspects of systems in
practical applications as hinted by the aforementioned case study. Hence, we would like to extend our
knowledge of this objective to more general models such as stochastic games, or games with multi-dimensional
weights. Of course, the open questions regarding the AEL objective are intriguing. Finally, we would like to
implement our techniques in synthesis tools and assess their applicability through proper case studies.
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